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THE INTERPLAY OF RACE AND FALSE
CLAIMS OF JURY NULLIFICATION
Nancy S. Marder*
After the verdicts in the OJ Simpson and Stacey Koon/Laurence Powell cases,
many in the press explained the juries' acquittals as instances of jury nullifica-
tion. However these were unlikely to have been instances of nullification,
particularly because the jurors explained that their verdicts were based on reason-
able doubt. One motivation for these false claims of jury nullification was the
homogeneity of the juries-a largely African-American jury in the case of Simpson
and a largely white jury in the case of Koon/Powell. Nullification became the
term by which press and public attempted to discredit verdicts rendered by juries
they distrusted. A false claim of nullification could also be used, as with the
Simpson case, to perpetuate racial stereotypes. One step toward reducing false
claims of nullfication and their concomitant harms is to encourage diverse juries.
INTRODUCTION
In two recent high-profile cases, the criminal trial of O.J. Simp-
son for the murders of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ron Goldman'
and the criminal trial of police officers Stacey Koon and Laurence
Powell for the beating of motorist Rodney King,' many in the press
and public labelled these verdicts as jury nullification. Although
they might have disagreed with these verdicts and harbored suspi-
cions about the largely homogeneous juries that rendered them, it
is unclear whether the verdicts really were instances of jury nullifi-
cation.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law School. B.A.
1980, Yale University; M. Phil. 1982, Cambridge University; J.D. 1987, Yale Law School. I
want to thank the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform for organizing a symposium
entitled "Jury Reform: MakingJuries Work" and for inviting me to participate on a panel on
Jury Nullification, from which this piece arose. I am also grateful for comments from Tom
Griffith, Elyn Saks, and Chuck Weisselberg, for the opportunity to present this and my other
work on nullification at a U.S.C. Faculty Workshop, the U.S.C. Faculty Women's Writing
Group, the Southern California Law Review, and the 1999 Law, Culture, and the Humani-
ties Second Annual Conference, and for valuable research assistance by Quesiyah Ali-
Chavez, Deja Hemingway, Kim Leone, and Jennifer Zolezzi. My research was generously
supported by the U.S.C. Faculty Research Fund.
1. See People v. Simpson, No. BA097211 (Cal. Super. Ct. LA. County 1995).
2. See People v. Powell, No. BA035498 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County 1991); Richard A.
Serrano, All 4 Acquitted in King Beating, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at Al.
3. See discussion infra Parts IA1, I.B.1.
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Jury nullification occurs when jurors choose not to follow the
law as it is given to them by the judge. The jurors in these two
cases claimed to be following the law. In a criminal case,5 nullifica-
tion occurs when the jury acquits a defendant even though it
believes the defendant is guilty under the stated legal standard. In
post-verdict interviews of the jurors in these two cases, however,
many explained that they had reasonable doubt, and therefore,
that the law obligated them to vote to acquit.6 Even if the jurors
were mistaken in their reasonable doubts, mistake and nullifica-
tion are not synonymous, so one question is: Why did so many
members of the press and public conclude that these juries had
nullified? A second question, and the one I will consider first, is
why false claims of nullification should be cause for concern.
False claims of nullification contribute to a sense that nullifica-
tion happens frequently, and therefore is a problem that needs to
be fixed. Judges and legislatures then feel the need to step in and
figure out how to limit juries' opportunities to engage in nullifica-
tion,7 which usually results in limitations on jury power.8 False
claims of nullification can be used to undermine a verdict by ques-
tioning its legitimacy. Even more insidiously, false claims can be
used to cast aspersions on the integrity and competence of the jury
that rendered the verdict. In the Simpson case, false claims were
used to perpetuate racial stereotypes about a largely African-
American jury.9
It is my contention that false claims of nullification feed on ho-
mogeneous juries, and thus, one way to guard against false claims
is to strive for diverse juries. When jurors are drawn from different
backgrounds, the jury is less likely to be suspected of group partial-
ity or animosity, and its verdict is more likely to be accepted. An
array of other benefits also flow from diverse juries-from jurors
who can evaluate the evidence from different perspectives to jurors
who are likely to engage in thorough and rigorous deliberations.
With much to gain from diverse juries and much to lose by allow-
ing false claims of nullification to persist, reform efforts should be
directed toward encouraging diverse juries.
4. For a detailed definition of nullification and a delineation of different types of
nullification, see Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 Nw. U. L. REv.
(forthcoming Fall 1999) [hereinafter Marder, Myth].
5. Theoretically, nullification can occur in a civil or criminal case. See id.
6. See discussion infra Parts IA3.a-b, I.B.3.a-b (discussing ways in which both the
Simpson verdict and the Koon/Powell verdicts could be seen as based on reasonable doubt
or honest mistake).
7. See discussion infra Part II.C.1-2.
8. See id.
9. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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I begin, in Part I, by describing the press coverage of the Simp-
son and Koon/Powell verdicts, and I explain why these verdicts
were unlikely to have been instances of nullification. In Part II, I
explore the dangers posed by false claims of nullification. Finally,
in Part III, I identify the diverse jury as the strongest defense
against such false claims, but I recognize that there are barriers to
achieving this goal fully.
I. Two EXAMPLES OF FALSE CLAIMS OF NULLIFICATION
In the Simpson and Koon/Powell verdicts, a common explana-
tion for the acquittals was jury nullification. Members of the press
gave various reasons why they thought the cases were examples of
nullification, but the underlying reason was that they disagreed
with the verdicts. Although many in the press labelled these ver-
dicts as nullification, there are other reasons, including ones given
by the jurors, that suggest that these verdicts were not based on
jury nullification.
A. O.J Simpson Verdict
Former football star O.J. Simpson was tried for the murders of
his ex-wife Nicole Brown Simpson and her friend Ron Goldman 1
in what was described as "the trial of the century."" Simpson was
acquitted by a jury consisting of eight African-American women,
one African-American man, two white women, and one Latino
man. 2 As a result of the acquittal in this highly-publicized case,
many members of the public were introduced to a new phrase: jury
nullification. As one columnist remarked, prior to this case "'jury
nullification' was just another obscure little doctrine that hardly
anyone but lawyers cared about. No more. Barber shops and
10. See People v. Simpson, No. BA097211 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County 1995).
11. Robert Marquand & Daniel B. Wood, Lessons Drawn from Simpson in Black, White,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 5, 1995, at 1 (describing three lessons to be drawn from this
"trial of the century").
12. SeeJeffrey Rosen, The Bloods and the Crits: O.J. Simpson, Critical Race Theory, the Law,
and the Triumph of Color in America, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 9, 1996, at 27, 36 (describing the
jury's composition); Charles E. Williams, George Will and the Incompetent O.J. Simpson Jury,
WASH. AFRO-AM., Dec. 9, 1995, atA5.
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beauty parlors everywhere are all abuzz with talk of 'jury nullifica-
tion,' whether they call it by its proper name or not.
13
1. Press Explanations for the Verdict-Journalists and commenta-
tors attributed the Simpson verdict to jury nullification for a
number of different reasons.14 One writer was so convinced that
Simpson had to be guilty that even before the verdict was reached
that writer concluded that an acquittal could only be the result of
jury nullification. 5 After the verdict, the press, often citing experts,
explained that for the jury to reach the verdict that it did, in the
face of so much evidence and after so little deliberation, the jury
must have engaged in nullification.1 r Nullification was the explana-
tion for why jurors needed so little time to reach a verdict because
they were prepared to "disregard the facts of a case." Some jour-
nalists suggested that the jurors engaged in nullification because
they were guided by emotion, rather than reason. Los AngelesDistrict Attorney Gil Garcetti reinforced this view when he de-
13. Clarence Page, O.J. Verdict Rekindles an Old Jury Debate, CINCINNATI POST, Nov. 16,
1995, at 21A, available in 1995 WL 9997665; see also All Things Considered: Simpson Case Focuses
Attention on Jury Nullification (NPR radio broadcast, Oct. 16, 1995), available in 1995 WL
9892228 [hereinafter All Things Considered: Simpson Case] ("The acquittal of O.J. Simpson
has renewed interest in the legal concept of jury nullification."); Marquand & Wood, supra
note 11, at 1 ("'Jury nullification' is the legal buzzword of the hour."); Michael Paul Wil-
liams, Juy Nullification Question Is Fallout of Simpson Trial, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, June 3,
1996, at BI, available in 1996 WL 2301517 ("Jury nullification became part of our national
vocabulary after the verdict in the O.J. Simpson trial.").
14. Certainly, not all members of the press, or even of the mainstream press, con-
cluded that the jury engaged in nullification or misused the term. However, many did, see
infra notes 15-30 and accompanying text, and it is their use of the term that I will be de-
scribing.
15. See 'Nullification' Becomes Factor in Simpson Case, ARIz. REPUBLIC, Oct. 2, 1995, at A2,
available in 1995 WL 2833747 (noting that most viewers of the Simpson trial were unfamiliar
with the term "jury nullification" but that they "could become familiar [with it] ifjurors who
begin deliberations today decide to vote from their hearts instead of their minds").
16. See id. ("In jury-nullification verdicts, the panel rarely takes time to examine the
evidence."); Mark Whitaker, Whites v. Blacks, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16, 1995, at 28, 31 ("When the
acquittal came back so swiftly, many commentators assumed that the largely black jury had
engaged in what legal experts call 'jury nullification'-ignoring the evidence to send a
broader message, in this case to the police."); see also Editorial, The Simpson Case: Black and
White Justice, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 4, 1995, at A18, available in 1995 WL 5301366 ("Although
Cochran denies it, many observers concluded that the skill and legal dexterity of the well-
financed defense team led to a case of 'jury nullification,' in which jurors were able to dis-
miss overwhelming evidence of guilt.").
17. Tony Knight, Debating Simpson Verdict: Opinion Split on Whether Acquittal Was Really
Condemnation of System, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 16, 1995, at NI, available in 1995 WL
5422994.
18. See, e.g., Mona Charen, Editorial, It's Foolish to Think Simpson Verdict Wasn't Racially
Motivated, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 16, 1995, available in 1995 WL 10505829 ("The jury did
not deliberate, it emoted."); Marquand & Wood, supra note 11, at 1 ("Along with race, three
major issues stand out in the aftermath of... [the verdict, including] 'jury nullification,' or
ajury's response to emotions rather than evidence.").
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scribed the verdict as one that "many people" would look at as jury
nullification and that the jury had based its decision "on emotion.
That overcame reason."' 9 Underlying this explanation was the view
thatjurors were swayed either by Simpson's status or race and that
they allowed such biases to determine their verdict.
Another explanation given by journalists for why the jurors had
engaged in nullification in this case was that they had been led by
defense attorney Johnnie Cochran to see Simpson as a victim of
racist police actions and of the criminal justice system. Journalists
engaged in debate about whether Cochran, in his closing argu-
ment, invited jurors to consider nullification.' ° Even if his plea for
nullification was veiled, the press focused on it in their reports of
his closing argument.2' Thus, some writers concluded that the ju-
rors had engaged in an act of protest or self-help at the behest of
Cochran; they had heeded his advice to use the jury's power of
nullification to free Simpson and to send a message to the police."
2. Ways In Which the Press Misunderstood Nuification-Although
the prevailing view of many mainstream newspaper writers was that
19. Special Report/Newscast: Members of OJ. Simpson's Family, Defense Lawyers and Prosecu-
tion Representatives React to the Verdict (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 3, 1995), available in
1995 WL 8371020; see alsoJulian Beltrame Vansun, The O.J Simpson Verdict: Not Guilty; After-
shocks of Simpson Acquittal Felt Beyond L.A., VANCOUVER SUN, Oct. 4, 1995, at A3, available in
WESTLAW, Paperscan Database.
20. Compare Marquand & Wood, supra note 11, at 1 ("[S]cholars disagree whether
Johnnie Cochran's final arguments asking the jury to 'send a message' to the Los Angeles
Police Department was nullification."), with RobertJ. Caldwell, Opinion, O.J Simpson Trial
After the Verdict, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 8, 1995, at CI, available in 1995 WL 10331706
("Cochran's evangelistic summation amounted to a thinly veiled invocation of the historic
doctrine known as jury nullification.' "), and Special Report/Analysis: New York Judge Leslie
Crocker Snyder Discusses the Issue of Cameras in Courtrooms and Judge Lance Ito's Conduct of the
O.J Simpson Trial (NBC television broadcast, Oct. 3, 1995), available in 1995 WL 2959486
("One of the things that was very disturbing to many of us was the jury nullification argu-
ment by Johnnie Cochran, which certainly wouldn't have been allowed in New York.")
(quoting Leslie Crocker Snyder, New York Supreme CourtJustice).
21. According to one press account:
In his closing argument, Simpson lead attorney Johnnie Cochran made a thinly
veiled appeal forjury nullification-that is, forjurors to look beyond the evidence of
the case and to send a message to the Los Angeles Police Department and the district
attorney through their verdict. And that is precisely what the jury did.
Editorial, Jury in the Simpson Case Sent Resounding Message, STATE J.-REG. (Springfield, Ill.),
Oct. 5, 1995, at 6, available in 1995 WL 9354171.
22. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 12, at 42 ("Cochran called on the jurors to refuse to ap-
ply ajust law in order to punish the police and to express solidarity with the defendant....
This is racist nullification in its purest form."); see also Michael E. Young & Marjorie Lam-
bert, Trial Seeped into Every Part of Life; Series: The Simpson Verdict, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale, Fla.), Oct. 3, 1995, at 4A, available in 1995 WL 8836189 ("The Simpson case,
perhaps more than any other, focused attention on race-based jury nullification, a phe-
nomenon few people outside the justice system even knew existed.").
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the jury had engaged in nullification,23 several writers' descriptions
of nullification suggest that they held mistaken views about what
constitutes nullification. Some members of the press believed the
jury nullified because it "disregard[ed] the facts., 24 It is unclear,
however, what is meant by "disregard[ing] the facts."2 It might
mean that the jury misinterpreted the facts or focused on the
wrong facts out of ignorance; however, that would not be nullifica-
tion. 6 It might mean that the jury was set upon reaching a certain
conclusion and did not let the facts get in the way of that conclu-
sion. In other words, the jurors knew that the facts established
guilt, but they did not care and voted not guilty, thus engaging in
nullification.
Some members of the press also believed that the jury nullified
because it was led by emotion rather than reason. A nullifying
jury could be swayed by emotion, such as prejudice, like the all-
white, all-male Southern juries that refused to convict whites
28
charged with crimes against African Americans. However, a nulli-
fying jury is not necessarily one that succumbs to emotion. A jury
could decide to nullify through a well-reasoned and thoughtful
analysis of the case. 29 Jurors could examine carefully all of the evi-
dence and the standards they must apply and, after much
deliberation, decide that the larger purposes of the law, such as
reaching a just result, require nullification. Such was the case in a
state court jury deliberation that was filmed and broadcast on tele-
vision.30 Thus, the dichotomy created by the press between rational
juries that follow the law and emotional juries that nullify is a false
one.
3. Why the Verdict May Not Have Been Based on Nullification
a. Reasonable Doubt-The most compelling reason for conclud-
ing that the Simpson verdict was not the result of a nullifying jury
is that the jurors who explained their reasoning said that they
reached their verdict based on reasonable doubt.3' All of the jurors
23. See discussion supra Part I.A.1.
24. Knight, supra note 17, at N1.
25. Id.
26. See discussion infra Part I.A.3.b.
27. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
28. See Marder, Myth, supra note 4 (describing all-white, all-male Southern juries that
nullified based on prejudice).
29. See id. (describingjuries that nullify after careful and thoughtful deliberation).
30. See Frontline: Inside the Jury Room (PBS television broadcast, Apr. 8, 1986). The case
involved Leroy Reed, a convicted felon charged with possessing a handgun. See id. For a
more detailed discussion of this case, see Marder, Myth, supra note 4.
31. See, e.g., Knight, supra note 17, at NI (" 'Things just didn't add up ....'") (quoting
Juror No. 4, David Aldana); id. (describing the view of Juror No. 8, Sheila Woods, who said
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who were interviewed after the verdict said that they voted for ac-
quittal because they believed the prosecution had failed to
establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt.32 Of course, those ju-
rors who agreed to be interviewed after the verdict did not speak
for all of the jurors, but those who did speak were consistent about
the basis for their verdict. Certainly, jurors can lie during post-
verdict interviews and may do so to portray themselves in the best
possible light. Jurors, however, do not suffer any legal conse-
quence for having nullified, 3 so jurors would not need to conceal
their true motivations, except perhaps to escape embarrassment.
Ironically, while the press wildly sought post-verdict interviews with
jurors (and rewarded some jurors with substantial amounts of
money) , the mainstream press did not credit the jurors' explanation
she "doubted the prosecution's theory of the crime"); Rivera Live: Analysis: Judging the Jury;
How Commentators and the Public Feel Towards the Jurors in the O.J. Simpson Trial and the Trial of
Christopher Lynn Johnson (CNBC television broadcast, Oct. 20, 1995), available in 1995 WL
2735950 [hereinafter Rivera Live] ("No one really thought [the evidence] was credible. You
know, with Fuhrman, the collection of the evidence, the sock that had no blood then had
blood-you know, these type of things.") (quoting Anise Aschenbach, Simpsonjuror).
32. See, e.g., All Things Considered: Simpson Case, supra note 13 ("Jurors insist that their
verdict [in the Simpson case] was based on insufficient evidence to convict."); Knight, supra
note 17, at NI ("U]urors on the predominantly African-American panel who have spoken
publicly have... sa[id] their decision was based on reasonable doubt, not empathy with the
race of the accused."); Tony Perry, The Simpson Verdicts, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1995, at A5
("One by one, the jurors are surfacing to explain ... that it was their doubt about the evi-
dence that caused them to acquit O.J. Simpson, not Cochran's eloquence or any desire to
make a social or political statement."); Rivera Live, supra note 31 ("I have heard nothing
from any juror that suggests... thatjury nullification was on their mind.... All of thejurors
are saying pretty much the same thing.... [W]hat they're saying, pretty much, is the evi-
dence.") (quoting L.A. Times reporter Andrea Ford); Whitaker, supra note 16, at 31
(describing the jurors as "insistent that they had called the case based on the evidence as
they saw it"); Williams, supra note 12, at A5 ("We learned, during post-trial interviews, that
jurors who had serious doubts about much of the prosecution's evidence fully complied
with the instructions, and that Johnnie Cochran's seeming appeal for nullification and
sending a message to corrupt police officers was disregarded as rhetoric."); id. ("The evi-
dence fully supported the jury's finding that the time-line laid out by the prosecution was
implausible.").
33. Ever since Bushel's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670), which freed a member of
the jury arrested for voting to acquit William Penn and William Mead against the weight of
the evidence, nullifying jurors have been protected from having to answer for their verdicts.
For an excellent account of the development of the English criminal jury and the role of
Bushel's Case, see THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPEC-
TIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIALJURY 1200-1800, at 236-49 (1985).
34. See, e.g., Timothy Egan, With Spotlight Shifted to Them, Some Simpson Jurors Talk Freely,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1995, at 1 ("Shadowed by news helicopters, limousines bearing network
celebrities and tabloid-television producers offering up to $100,000 for exclusives, a few of
the jurors in the O.J. Simpson murder trial emerged today to give insight into their cele-
brated verdicts."); Keith Stone, Courtroom to Talk Circuit: Simpson Cast Cashing in, L.A. DAILY
NEWS, Oct. 7, 1995, at N1, available in 1995 WL 5421885 ("And among the jurors, several
have hired lawyers to help them steer through a maze of interview and book deals paved in
gold."); id. ("And if the experiences of dismissed jurors Michael Knox and Tracy Kennedy
WINTER 1999]
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that their verdict was based on reasonable doubt, as demonstrated
by many writers' labelling of the verdict as nullification.
However, some journalists, 36 including many African-American
writers and those writing for a largely African-American audience,
accepted the jurors' explanation of reasonable doubt as the basis
for their verdict. Under their reading, the jury followed the law
because the law required a certain standard of proof that the
prosecution had failed to satisfy. The evidence that many in the
mainstream press saw as overwhelming, such as DNA, took on
much less significance in the African-American press in light of
other gaps in the prosecution's case, such as the time-line, the
glove that did not fit, the racism of Mark Fuhrman, and the view
are any measure, the jurors can expect to be richly rewarded for completing their yearlong
civic duty. Knox and Kennedy won six-figure book deals .... .").
35. See, e.g., Caldwell, supra note 20, at GI ("Yet, Cochran's barely disguised plea for
nullification worked, whatever the jurors now say about voting to acquit strictly on the evi-
dence."); Charen, supra note 18 ("At least one juror is now fatuously claiming that the
verdict was based on insufficient evidence of Simpson's guilt. But in light of the cascade of
evidence produced by the prosecution, such a claim is preposterous.").
Jeffrey Rosen, for example, did not address the jurors' own accounts of how they reached
their verdict; rather, he alluded to other signs that suggested, in his view, that the jurors had
engaged in racially-based nullification. He wrote:
Darden recalls that early in the deliberations one juror heard another say: 'This is
payback time!' The prosecution decided that it was a bad sign when another juror
was seen carrying a copy of Nathan McCall's minor classic of black rage, Makes Me
Wanna Holler, which begins with McCall's gleeful account of his brutal beating of a
white boy who strayed into his neighborhood.... After the verdict was announced,
Lon Cryer, juror number six, turned to Simpson and raised his fist in a black power
salute. And as the jurors sat in silence in the eleventh-floor lounge, one of them, Car-
rie Bess, announced to no one in particular: 'We've got to protect our own.'
Rosen, supra note 12, at 41-42.
36. See, e.g., Curtis E. Bray, Letter to Editor, Angy White Male, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 19,
1995, at A27, available in 1995 WL 5303369 ("I'm writing this letter as an angry white
male.... White American [s] should blame the LAPD and not the African American jury.");
Stanley Crouch, The Good News, EsQuiRE, Dec. 1995, at 108, 114 ("[A] deeply disturbed
Mario Cuomo observed, there was more than enough to raise a 'reasonable doubt,' but
endless white Americans were distraught because the jury took that doubt's specifically
instructed meaning so seriously."); Morning Edition: O.J. Verdict Just as Creators Intended, Pro-
fessor Says (NPR radio broadcast, Oct. 10, 1995), available in 1995 WL 9486093 [hereinafter
Morning Edition] ("It's possible that the jury honestly decided that the prosecution did not
meet its burden of proof.... .") (quoting commentator and sociology professor Richard
Moran); William Raspberry, Editorial, Guilty, but Not Guilty Accepting the O.J. Paradox, Prilr.
POST-GAZETrE, Oct. 6, 1995, at A19, available in 1995 WL 9536791 ("Maybe subsequent
interviews with jury members will yet disclose an element of nullification ... [b]ut until
then, it seems plausible to me that the jury had doubts that Marcia Clark and Chris Darden,
for all their closing-argument brilliance, couldn't overcome."); Rivera Live, supra note 31
("What the jurors are saying is they believed there was reasonable doubt.... That's not jury
nullification. We can disagree with whether they, in fact, were correct in finding reasonable
doubt, but nonetheless it is not nullification we're talking about.") (quoting Loyola Law
School Professor Stan Goldman).
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that police officers may well have planted evidence. As one writer
explained: "Simpson was acquitted in a court of law, but convicted
in the court of white public opinion. The jurors resent this. They
insist that they acquitted Simpson on the evidence and testimony,
not his color. They are probably right."3 s This view was echoed by a
reporter who suggested that those outside the jury room should
"listen to what these jurors are saying .... What they say repeatedly
is the evidence, the evidence, the evidence; there was reasonable
doubt.
3 9
b. Honest Mistake-The jurors may have had reasonable doubt
and may have been mistaken as to that determination, but that is
quite different than intentionally engaging in nullification.40 Ajury
can make a mistake for any number of reasons. Foremost is that
juries, like judges, are fallible. There will be times when human
decisionmakers reach erroneous conclusions. There are a number
37. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Opinion, OJ Reckoning: Rage for a New Justice, WASH. POST,
Oct. 8, 1995, at C1 ("I think the reason the jurors did not look at O.J. when they announced
their verdict was because, like me, they thought he probably did it. Nonetheless, like me, they
also had reasonable doubt."); Editorial, Not Guilty; The O.J. Simpson Case:Jury Decision, Will
Not, Should Not, Eliminate Reasonable Doubts, BALT. SUN, Oct. 4, 1995, at 18A, available in 1995
WL 2467016 [hereinafter Editorial, Not Guilty] ("[M]ore persuasively, perhaps, were the
many flaws in the state's presentation: the sloppy handling of evidence, the racial bias of a
key detective, the lack of a murder weapon."); id. ("This is a time to pause... and to give
those 12 jurors the presumption that they did their honest best under difficult circum-
stances."); Carl Rowan, Opinion, O.J. Simpson Jury Showed Courage, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 5,
1995, at Al1, available in 1995 WL 3160390 ("I found the prosecution's 'ocean of evidence'
against Simpson fatally poisoned by sloppiness, perjury, corruption and perhaps worse on
the part of officers of the Los Angeles Police Department. So, apparently, did the jurors.");
Williams, supra note 12, at A5 (describing evidence that supported the jury's verdict); Mi-
chael Paul Williams, supra note 13, at B1 ("'[You had plenty of evidence that evidence had
been planted, that police officers had lied, and the prosecution got caught trying to pass off
(former Detective Mark) Fuhrman as a Boy Scout. I think the jury could reasonably con-
clude that they did not know what happened.'") (quoting Rep. Robert C. Scott of Virginia);
see also Randall Kennedy, After the Cheers: The Justice System and Black America, NEw REPUBLIC,
Oct. 23, 1995, at 14, 16 (recognizing that "the prosecution did permit a reasonable juror to
vote to acquit on the basis of the evidence presented" and "conced[ing] that [the verdict]
... could be reached reasonably and in good faith," but also identifying other rationales
that could lead to the verdict, such as a response to past racist acts by white juries in the
South or the need to send the police a message).
38. Earl Ofari Hutchinson, Why White America Won't Accept the Simpson Verdict, NEW
PTT. COURIER, Oct. 18, 1995, atA7, available in 1995 WL 15440556.
39. Rivera Live, supra note 31 (quoting L.A. Times reporter Andrea Ford). In an inter-
view, Professor Lani Guinier recommended that those outside the jury room should try to
"understand that the jur[ors] w[ere] dealing with the facts as they saw [them) from their
experience and that their experience is a legitimate experience." Face the Nation: Interview:
Professor Lani Guinier of University of Pennsylvania Law School Discusses the Aftermath of the OJ
Simpson Verdict (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 8, 1995), available in 1995 WL 7454909
[hereinafter Face the Nation].
40. 1 believe that nullification requires the subjective intent of the jurors, even if they
do not use the exact word. Mere mistake is not nullification. See Marder, Myth, supra note 4.
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of other factors that increase the chances that a jury might make a
mistake. The Simpson case was rife with such possibilities, includ-
ing the following: disparity in the skills of the lawyers for each side;
complicated evidence that is difficult to understand and about
which experts may disagree; a lengthy trial leading to a tired jury;
jurors with similar perspectives who fail to challenge each other's
assumptions; and sequestration that creates isolation. Reaching a
possibly erroneous determination, however, is not synonymous
with deliberately deciding not to follow the law.
B. Stacey Koon and Laurence Powell Verdicts
Like the verdict in the O.J. Simpson case, the verdicts in the
trial of Stacey Koon and Laurence Powell were greeted with dis-
belief by many and accompanied by explanations of
nullification by some.42 Sergeant Stacey C. Koon and Officers
Laurence M. Powell, Theodore J. Briseno, and Timothy E.
Wind,43 white police officers, were charged with using excessive
force in the beating of black motorist Rodney King in an incident
that was captured on videotape by an amateur photographer."
The case was transferred from Los Angeles County to Ventura
County (Simi Valley) because of the pre-trial publicity4 5 and was
tried before a predominantly white jury. After seven days of de-
liberation, the jury acquitted the four officers on all counts,
except for one assault charge against Powell on which the jury
deadlocked. 47  The verdicts were met with "shock,"
4 8
41. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
42. See infta notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
43. I will refer to the verdicts collectively as "Koon/Powell."
44. See Serrano, supra note 2, at Al.
45. See Alan Dershowitz, Once Again, Jury Errs on Defendants' Side, BUFF. NEWS, May 5,
1992, at B2, available in 1992 WL 3632573 ("[Blecause the videotape was played and re-
played, especially in Los Angeles, the defendants demanded, and received, a change of
venue from Los Angeles... to Simi Valley. ... ").
46. The jury included 10 white jurors, 1 Latina, and 1 Asian-American juror. See Ser-
rano, supra note 2, atAl. Six of the jurors were men and six were women. See id.
47. See Linda Deutsch, Juy Reaches Partial Verdict; Hearing Set, AP, Apr. 29, 1992, avail-
able in 1992 WL 5295423 (listing counts and jury's decision on each count); Serrano, supra
note 2, at Al.
48. Leslie Berkman, Verdict Shocks O.C. Chiefs, Black Leaders, LA. TIMEs, Apr. 30, 1992,
at Al ("Shock and outrage were expressed by a number of Orange County police chiefs and
leaders of the county's black community in the wake of the acquittal .. .. "); William F. Gib-
son, Flabbergasted on the Acquittal of the Four L.A. Police Officers, NEW J. & GUIDE, May 13-19,
1992, at 2 ("When I heard the results of the acquittal of the four Los Angeles police officers,
I was flabbergasted and shocked beyond belief.") (quoting Gibson, Chairman of the Na-
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"astonishment,"49 and "disgust and anger"5° because almost every-
one had seen the videotape of the officers beating Rodney King
replayed on television and had assumed that the only possible out-
come could be verdicts of guilty. Soon after, the outrage5' turned
tional Board of Directors, NAACP); Larry Gross & Justin Blum, 4 Cops Found Not Guilty in
Rodney King Beating, Cu. DEFENDER, Apr. 30, 1992, at I ("Local residents and community
leaders expressed anger, shock, outrage and disbelief Wednesday after a California jury
found four white Los Angeles police officers not guilty in the beating of Black motorist
Rodney King."); Serrano, supra note 2, atAl ("'I am shocked, outraged, and frightened for
our nation ... ') (quoting Dr. Joseph Lowery, President of the Southern Christian Lead-
ership Conference); id. ("'My reaction is shock first, then disappointment ..... ") (quoting
Deputy District Attorney Terry White, the lead prosecutor of the case); id. ("William Frio,
spokesman for the LAPD, said he was shocked. . . ."); Henry Weinstein & Paul Lieberman,
Location of Tyial Played Major Role, Legal Experts Say, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, atAl8 (" 'I'm
shocked because in this case you had the most compelling form of evidence in support of
the charges-a videotape of the beating .... ) (quoting Laurie Levenson, a law professor
at Loyola Law School); Ben Winton & Glen Creno, Valley Blacks Angry, Frustrated, Say Justice
Denied to Minorities, Asuz. REPUBLIC, Apr. 30, 1992, at Al, available in 1992 WL 8240037
("Residents of Phoenix's white neighborhoods also were shocked by the verdict.")..
49. Serrano, supra note 2, at Al ("Throughout Los Angeles, residents who sat glued to
their television sets to watch the delivering of the verdicts expressed outrage and astonish-
ment.").
50. Berkman, supra note 48, at Al ("'I hope that we, as an African-American commu-
nity, will be able to channel some of our disgust and anger to effect a change in the way our
community is policed.'") (quoting Thomas Parham, Director of the Counseling and Career
Center at the University of California-Irvine); see also Jorge Casuso, L.A. Cops Acquitted in
Beating: Video Failed to Sway Jurors, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 30, 1992, at C1 ("'I'm really angry this has
happened because it shows the system doesn't work.'") (quoting Councilman Michael
Woo); Haya El Nasser & Sally Ann Stewart, In Fear of AmeriKKKan'Justice, USA TODAY, Apr.
30, 1992, at 3A, available in 1992 WL 8395559 (" 'I'm just disgusted [with the verdict].... It's
sick.'") (quoting Harriett Mack, wife of John Mack, President of the Los Angeles Urban
League).
51. See, e.g., Robert W. Bogle, Philadelphia Tribune Head Angry, NEW J. & GUIDE, May
13-19, 1992, at 2 ("I am outraged and appalled that 12 human beings-regardless of race or
cultural background-could witness a brutal and savage beating of another human being,
yet fully exonerate the attackers.") (quoting Bogle, President, National Newspaper Publish-
ers Association); Earlean Collins, King Verdict Leaves Us with Much Work, CHI. DEFENDER, May
5, 1992, at 10 ("[L]ike millions of other Americans, I was outraged at the result [after the
beating of Rodney King].") (quoting Collins, Illinois State Senator); Linda Deutsch, L.A.
Police Acquitted in Beating Video Doesn't Sway Jury; NAACP Denounces Verdict, NEW ORLEANS
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr. 30, 1992, at Al, available in 1992 WL 4826542 ("'My client and I are
just outraged,' King's attorney, Steve Lerman, said after the verdict."); Lenora Fulani, Ameri-
can Voters Need to Riot!, NEWJ. & GUIDE, May 13-19, 1992, at 2 ("The acquittal of the four
Los Angeles police officers who beat Rodney King with such savagery and sadism is an out-
rage.") (quoting Fulani, Chairperson of the New Alliance Party); Marshall Mitchell, In Los
Angeles: Business as Usual? Not Quite, AFRO-AM., May 9, 1992, at Al ("The community was
outraged after the 'not guilty' verdicts were announced and what started out as a peaceful
demonstration quickly degenerated to a racial melee."); Nation Voices Outrage, Shock, Despair
Over King Verdict, JET, May 18, 1992, at 13 ("As outrage over the Rodney King verdict ex-
ploded in violence throughout the streets of Los Angeles, national leaders.., vocalized
their alarm over the jury's finding and dread of the ensuing fury."); Joy M. Tyler, Baltimore
Escapes Violence?, AFRO-AM., May 9, 1992, at Al ("'Through the rally, we hope to bring to-
gether ... people ... from all racial and ethnic groups who have turned to the NAACP to
ask what can they do to express their outrage at the King verdict in a constructive way and to
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to violence as riots erupted in Los Angeles52 and in other cities
throughout the country.
5 3
1. Press Explanations for the Verdict-As newspaper writers and1 4
commentators tried to help the public make sense of the verdicts,
jury nullification was one of several explanations offered.5  Some
writers reasoned that if jurors nullified, they did so because they
move toward the elimination of this type of conduct in the future....'") (quoting then-
NAACP Director and CEO, Benjamin L. Hooks); Olive Vassell, Leaders Condemn King Verdict,
WASH. AFRO-AM., May 2, 1992, at Al (quoting L.A. Mayor Tom Bradley, who urged citizens
to "'focus our outrage' and demand the firing of the officers"); Amy Wallace & David Fer-
rell, Verdicts Greeted with Outrage and Disbelief LA. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at Al ("Outrage and
indignation swept the city Wednesday as citizens rich and poor, black and white, struggled
to reconcile the acquittals of four Los Angeles Police Department officers with the alarm-
ing, violent images captured on a late-night videotape."); id. ("At Cal State Los Angeles,
about 40 students watched the verdict announcement at the Student Union. For most,
including black student Kim Williams, the acquittals provoked outrage."); Winton & Creno,
supra note 48, at Al ("Outrage about the verdict appeared nearly uniform.").
52. See Richard A. Serrano & Tracy Wilkinson, All 4 in King Beating Acquitted; Violence
Follows Verdicts, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at Al ("It was the largest rioting to erupt in Los
Angeles since the Watts riots of 1965.").
53. See, e.g., Mitchell Landsberg, Verdict Sparks Protests Around Nation; Some Turn Ugly,
AP, Apr. 30, 1992, available in 1992 WL 5295544 ("Protesters rallied nationwide ... , and
blacks attacked whites in Atlanta. Rioting in San Francisco prompted the mayor to declare a
state of emergency."); id. ("Few court decisions have prompted such nationwide outpour-
ings."); Charles Whitaker, The Rodney King Wake-Up Call: Which Way America?, EBONY, July
1992, at 116, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Ebony File (describing the verdict as
"sparking the biggest urban riot of this century").
54. See, e.g., Dennis Wagner, Now Explain to Children How 'The System' Works for Them,
PHOENIX GAZE-I-rE, Apr. 30, 1992, at Al, available in WESTLAW, ARPG Database (struggling
for explanations, but concluding that "[tihe search for reasonable explanations proved
futile").
55. See Gail Appleson, King Verdict Shakes Faith injuy System, Reuters N. Am. Wire, May
3, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, TXTNWS File ("Legal experts said the King ver-
dict points out one of the most difficult problems to overcome with jurors-a problem they
call 'nullification.'"); Jason Berry, Crime Punishment; Why Do Some Juries Condone Criminal
Behavior?, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 27, 1994, at 1J, available in 1994 WL 6848006 ("The
nullification factor in these cases [including Simi Valley] stemmed from a parochial protec-
tiveness layered in denial."); Alan W. Bock, Editorial, Criminal Justice: King Beating Started a
Cycle of Violence, ORANGE CouTrv REG. (Cal.), May 1, 1992, available in 1992 WL 6349907
("[W]hat we saw in Simi Valley ... was a case of surreptitious jury nullification. The jury
simply decided, in this case, to ignore the law, although it's unlikely any of them would
admit it."); Dershowitz, supra note 45, at B2 ("[T]he most common manifestation of what
has come to be called 'jury nullification' has always been in cases where policemen were
charged with the use of excessive force, especially when that force was directed against so-
called 'undesirable elements.'"); Richard Lacayo, Anatomy of an Acquittal, TIME, May 11,
1992, at 30 ("In the eyes of many people, both white and black, it appears that the jury sim-
ply chose to nullify the evidence-to put it aside in making their decision-which American
law allows."); Michael W. Rosen,Juries Should Have toFollow the Law, COLO. SPRINGS GAZErrE
TELEGRAPH, May 17, 1992, at G2, available in 1992 WL 9888895 ("If you liked the Rodney
King verdict, you'll lovejury nullification.");Jerome H. Skolnick, TheJuiy Was NeverMeant to
Be Rational, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1992, at B7 ("The independence of juries is so valued that
they are allowed to nullify the evidence and fail to convict, when it is perfectly clear, as in
the King trial, that the defendants are guilty.").
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shared a similar background and outlook with the defendant po-
lice officers."6 They may have had "pre-existing attitudes that favor
police officers and fear crime." 7 The press gave another reason
that supported nullification: The change in venue from Los Ange-
les to Simi Valley meant that those in the jury pool, and those who
eventually served on the jury, were from a fairly homogeneous
58group. Many residents of Simi Valley had moved there from Los
Angeles to escape crime, gangs, and other urban ills, and they
shared a respect for police officers and the difficulties their jobs
entailed.55
56. See Appleson, supra note 55 (describing nullification as when the jurors, "because
of their backgrounds, sympathize or identify so closely with a defendant that they ignore the
law or fail to see obvious facts in a case"); Berry, supra note 55, at 1J (explaining nullification
in Simi Valley as follows: "[T] he jury saw the police officers as gladiators in a crime war and
affirmed the officers' brutal behavior."); Dershowitz, supra note 45, at B2 ("U]urors viewed
the evidence through the prism of their own experiences. Jurors are more likely to sympa-
thize with the arguments of those with whom they most closely identify."); Eleanor Holmes
Norton, Op-Ed, Time to Turn to the Backup System; The Federal Criminal Civil Rights Statutes Can
Serve Justice and Restore Confidence, WASH. POST, May 1, 1992, at A27 ("The jury nullification
in this case came not only because the suburban jury identified with the police. The jury
bought the defense, as one juror has said in an interview, that the officers were doing what
the L.A. Police Department expected them to do.").
57. Serrano, supra note 2, at Al; see Weinstein & Lieberman, supra note 48, at A18
("Several experts... said the verdicts clearly reflected pre-existing attitudes-support of
police, fear of street crime, perhaps racism-held by the jury.... ."); see also Charles G. Ad-
ams, Opinion, Video, Verdict and Violence, MICH. CHRON., May 13-19, 1992, at 7A ("It is not to
be expected that an all-white jury in the community of Simi Valley, where the Ronald Rea-
gan Presidential Library is located, was going to find White policemen [g]uilty of criminal
behavior in the process of subduing a young Black male."); Brenda H. Andrews, Rodney King
Verdict, Law and Order Mandate, NEwJ. & GUIDE, May 13-19, 1992, at 2 ("The verdict in the
Rodney King case comes from a group of all-American jurors who bought into the prevail-
ing mandate that Black men are likely to be criminals, and that crime and criminal
elements can be controlled by any means necessary."); Kathleen O'Toole, An Imbalance of
Justice: The Simi Valley Verdict, ABOUT ... TIME, June 1992, at 29 ("The verdict... may reflect
a growing sentiment for law and order at all costs.") (paraphrasing Stanford Law School
Professor Gerald Gunther).
58. See, e.g., Larry Aubry, Shameful Decision, Prophetic Aftermath, L.A. SENTINEL, May 7,
1992, at A6 ("[T]he change of venue sealed the outcome of the case by ensuring a non-
sympathetic, exclusively White perspective."); Linda Deutsch, Jurors Accepted Argument that
King Was Askingfor It, AP, Apr. 29, 1992, available in 1992 WL 5295333 ("Moving the trial out
of Los Angeles to suburban Simi Valley clearly had an effect. The hysteria that surrounded
the case was gone, and instead of the racially mixed jury expected in Los Angeles, the panel
was predominantly white."); Benjamin L. Hooks, NAACP National Office Speaks Out on Rodney
King Verdict, CRIsIs, Apr.-May 1992, at 2 ("We are convinced that the change of venue that
produced an all-white jury, and Mr. King's race were major factors in the acquittals.").
59. See, e.g., All Things Considered: Rodney King Verdict Due to Many Factors (NPR radio
broadcast, Apr. 30, 1992), available in LEXIS, News Library, NPR File [hereinafter All Things
Considered: Rodney King] ("The city of Simi Valley where the trial was held has one of the very
lowest crime rates in California. Lots of Los Angeles Police officers and retired officers live
there.") (quoting NPR reporter Wendy Kaufman); Sharon LaFranier & Lynne Duke, Juries
Often Forgive Police, Legal Experts Say, TORONTO STAR, Apr. 30, 1992, at A2, available in 1992
WL 6541020 ("Most [criminal defense specialists' explanations of the verdict] focused on
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The press offered a variety of other explanations. One explana-
tion faulted the prosecution for failing to have King testify. 60 King
did not testify because he had a criminal record, 61 but if he had
testified he might have made the beating seem more real to the
jurors.62 According to another explanation, the videotape, which
was played repeatedly at trial, often in slow motion, and analyzed
frame by frame, might have de-sensitized the jurors to the violence
63
on the screen. Relatedly, the public saw only the videotape, but
the jurors saw and heard much additional evidence,64 including the
65testimony of fifty-six witnesses, many of whom were experts in law
enforcement. 66 Yet another explanation was that there had been
competing expert testimony, which led some to suggest that the
the defence attorneys' success in moving the trial to a bedroom community of retired police
officers and firefighters with few minorities."); Dawn Webber, Prosecution Strategies Criticized;
No Testimony by King Viewed as Major Flaw, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 30, 1992, at NI, available in
1992 WL 8167304 (describing Ventura County as follows: "where the majority of the popu-
lation is white and known to be pro-law enforcement").
60. 'See Linda Deutsch, The Jury, the Media-and the Riot;Jurors Toe 'The Thin Blue Line,
CHI. TRIB., Apr. 30, 1992, at C8 [hereinafter Deutsch, The Jury] ("The lack of testimony
from King... may have tipped the scales toward the defense."); id. ("'Had King been able
to talk to us, the video might have been looked at differently ... .'") (quoting an anony-
mous juror on ABC's Nightline); Webber, supra note 59, at NI ("The decision by the Los
Angeles County District Attorney's Office not to call Rodney King as a witness was cited ...
as the critical flaw that led to the acquittal of four LAPD officers charged with beating the
black motorist."); Weinstein & Lieberman, supra note 48, at A18 (quoting Los Angeles de-
fense attorney Howard Weitzman, who explained that if he were a juror he "'would have
liked to have heard from Rodney King, what he felt, why he continued to move and what
was going through his mind'").
61. See Weinstein & Lieberman, supra note 48, at A18 ("Whatever might have been
gained by King's description of his suffering, [experts] said, could have been outweighed by
the opportunity it would have given the defense to highlight King's criminal record, in
effect putting him on trial.").
62. See, e.g., Juror: Verdicts Might Have Been Different if King Had Testified, AP, Apr. 30,
1992, available in 1992 WL 5295571 [hereinafter Juror] ("'Had King been able to talk to us,
the video might have been looked at differently.'") (quotingjuror on ABC's Nightline).
63. See All Things Considered: Rodney King, supra note 59 ("Again and again, [defense at-
torneys] just undermined the credibility of-of the videotape and ... it became almost
obsolete and.., worth very little.") (quoting unidentified Juror #2); Deutsch, The Jury, supra
note 60, at C8 ("Defense lawyers played the tape so many times at so many different speeds
that its impact may have been blunted."); Webber, supra note 59, at N1 ("'Looking at that
videotape over and over again could have led the jury to forget the significance of what was
done to Rodney King. ) (quoting UCLA School of Law Professor Peter Arenella);
Weinstein & Lieberman, supra note 48, at A18 ("'[Wihen you see that videotape over and
over and over and you don't have any feeling for the individual, I have to surmise that the
jurors got desensitized to the video .... ") (quoting Southwestern University School of Law
Professor Myrna Raeder).
64. See Eric W. Rose & Steven S. Lucas, The Jury Saw All of the Evidence; System Overcame
Political Hysteria and Media Hype, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at B7 ("For the jury, the video-
tape was one of many pieces of evidence to evaluate and weigh in a complex case. For the
public, the videotape was the sole piece of evidence.").
65. See id. ("In this trial, no fewer than 56 witnesses were called to the stand.")
66. See id.
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jurors reached their verdict based on reasonable doubt.67 In oth-
ers' view, the verdict showed how hard it is to convict police
officers given the difficult job they are required to perform. 6 For
many, however, especially for many African Americans, there was
no explanation for the verdict other than the racism of the jurors
and the police. 69
67. See Weinstein & Lieberman, supra note 48, at A18 ("'When you have experts testi-
fying on both sides of a case, you create reasonable doubt .... ') (quoting New York
attorney Harvey Weitz); id. ("'[The verdict] was just 12 people who had a reasonable
doubt.'") (quoting New York University Law School Professor Burt Neuborne); see also
Deutsch, The Juy, supra note 60, at C8 ("The defense offered several explanations to pro-
vide the reasonable doubt needed to acquit, including officers' fears that they were dealing
with an intoxicated, potentially deadly individual.").
68. See, e.g., Pamela Kramer & Christopher H. Schmitt, Evidence and Outcome of King
Case at Odds; Stunned Experts Grope for Reasons Why Jurors Cleared L.A. Officers, BUFF. NEWS,
Apr. 30, 1992, at A5, available in 1992 WL 3631440 ("'Ordinary citizens have, by virtue of life
experience, been taught to trust police officers. They can't put those pro-police biases be-
hind them.'") (quoting attorney Tom Beck); Anthony Sommer & Russ Hemphill, Verdict
Surprises Some Valley Police, Law Experts, PHOENiX GAZETTE, Apr. 30, 1992, at A2, available in
WESTLAW, ARPG Database ("[C]riminal misconduct cases against police officers are ex-
tremely rare because the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is so heavy on the
prosecutor.") (citing Arizona State University Law School Professor David Kaye, who offered
this information to help explain the Koon/Powell verdicts); Sheryl Stolberg, Videotape
Doesn't Sway the Panel, DET. NEWS, Apr. 30, 1992, at 8A ("The jury's verdict proved to be a
resounding endorsement of the police officers' conduct. There was no wavering, and no
discussion of reasonable doubt."); id. ("Some criminal justice specialists said the verdict is a
dramatic illustration of how difficult it is to convict law enforcement officers.").
69. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 57, at 2 ("[A]t least two logical factors commonly are
cited as contributing to the riots[, o]ne is the poverty... of the rioters; the second is middle
class racism that marks the lives of the jurors who made the decision that sparked the tur-
moil."); Collins, supra note 51, at 10 ("[T]he verdicts remind me of the days when there was
no such thing as a fair trial for Blacks in this country.... [A] white person who committed a
crime against a Black person, no matter how atrocious, could be assured of getting away
with it."); Michael Datcher, The April 1992 Uprising: Learning to Deal with Anger, L.A. SENTI-
NEL, Apr. 25, 1996, at Al, available in 1996 WL 15757697 (" 'The jury was blinded by their
own racism. They didn't see a black life on that television nearly being destroyed, they saw
something less than human.'") (quoting Milton Grimes, Rodney King's former attorney for
the civil rights trial); Gross & Blum, supra note 48, at 1 ("[The verdict] proves that racism is
alive and well and it says that a police officer in California, Chicago or around the country
can do whatever he wants to an African American or minority.") (quoting Chicago Alder-
man Robert Shaw); Hooks, supra note 58, at 2 ("We are convinced that the change of venue
that produced an all-white jury, and Mr. King's race were major factors in the acquittals.");
Kramer & Schmitt, supra note 68, at A5 ("But simmering not far below the surface was an
uglier explanation [for the verdict] many didn't want to include but nevertheless seemed
drawn to: racism, pure and simple."); id. ("'Did race play a role? One would have to be
naive not to think so .... '") (quoting Stanford Law School Professor Miguel Mendez);
Vassell, supra note 51, at Al ("'African Americans and many others are grieved by this inex-
plicable miscarriage ofjustice, that will reinforce the belie[f] there is a double standard of
justice when race enters the picture.'") (quoting NAACP Executive Director Benjamin
Hooks); Wagner, supra note 54, at Al ("I started thinking of it as a black-white thing .... I
know if it was five black men beating on some white guy... [t] hey would have been guilty.")
(quoting teenager Sej McLean); id. (interviewing Jarlean Milton, who said she could offer
no other explanation to her children but that "'It's prejudice .... ' "); Winton & Creno,
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2. Ways In Which the Press Misunderstood Nullification-The press
used the term "nullification" as a way of explaining a verdict that
seemed inexplicable. When journalists did not know how to make
sense of the verdicts because they seemed at odds with the video-
tape of the beating, they resorted to nullification as an
explanation. Thus, nullification became a catch-all phrase to ex-
plain the irrational; however, nullification is not synonymous with
irrational decisionmaking. Although a nullifying jury can reach an
irrational result, it can also reach a rational one. Thus, nullifica-
tion should not be equated automatically with inexplicable
verdicts. Indeed, the jurors on the Koon/Powell jury had reasons
for their decision and believed they were following the law as given
to them by the judge, thus suggesting that they believed not only
that they acted rationally, but also that they acted in accordance
with the law. °
3. Why the Verdict May Not Have Been Based on Nullification
a. Reasonable Doubt-In post-verdict interviews, jurors explained
that they reached their verdict based on reasonable doubt.7 Im-
mediately after the verdict, the jurors were escorted away in a van."
They declined to speak to reporters and left a written statement
to be read by a court official, which said: "'This experience has
been an extremely difficult and stressful one, one that we have all
agonized over a great deal.... We feel we have done the best job
we could have done.' ,74 Only later did individual jurors speak to
the press, including one who expressed the view that the fault was
with Rodney King for failing to comply with orders, "continu[ing]
to fight," and "controlling the whole show with his actions."75 An-
other juror felt constrained by the precise terms of the
instructions: "'I believe there was excessive use of force, but under
the law as it was explained to us we had to identify specific "hits"
that would show specific use of force. It had to be beyond a rea-
supra note 48, at Al (interviewing African-American men "who say they feel the jury's ver-
dict perpetuates decades of racial injustice").
70. See discussion infra Part I.B.3.a.
71. See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
72. See Casuso, supra note 50, at Cl (describing jurors' exit from the courthouse); Ser-
rano, supra note 2, at Al (describing the same).
73. See Deutsch, The Jury, supra note 60, at C8 ("Jurors left the courthouse without ex-
plaining the verdicts. Some fled their homes rather than face reporters.").
74. Serrano, supra note 2, at Al.
75. Id.; see All Things Considered: Rodny King, supra note 59 ("[Rodney King]'s the one
that was controlling the action all the way through. He continued to make motions to get
away, to escape, he kicked at the officers, etc. So there was nothing else the officers could
do, in our opinion.") (quoting unidentified Juror #1).
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sonable doubt, and I just couldn't do that.' 7 6 Thus, some jurors
described a deliberation process in which they were trying to fol-
low the law. They burrowed deep into the language of the
instructions," which is contrary to flouting the instructions describ-
ing the law, as nullification requires."
b. Honest Mistake-The Koon/Powell verdicts even if incorrect,
could have been reached through honest mistake. The jurors
viewed the evidence and testimony through the lens of citizens
who have much faith in police officers and who are willing to grant
them a great deal of leeway in the performance of their jobs. They
might have been mistaken in their understanding of the judge's
instructions and what meaning to give to "excessive force." Or they
might have been mistaken in their understanding of the standard
of reasonable doubt. Or they might have burrowed too deeply into
the videotape of the beating and the instructions of the judge and
lost the forest for the trees. All of these were possibilities, and
some were considered by the press, but ultimately they failed to
persuade.
II. WHY FALSE CLAIMS MATTER
A. False Claims Perpetuate Racial Stereotypes
With both the Simpson and Koon/Powell verdicts, the main-
stream press misapplied the term jury nullification. It did so,
however, in different ways. With the Koon/Powell verdicts, the
press gave nullification as one possible explanation, even though
those jurors who were interviewed indicated that they were per-
suaded by the defense attorneys' explanation that the police
officers were merely doing their job and that Rodney King was
76. Lacayo, supra note 55, at 32.
77. The jurors, by burrowing deeper and deeper into the minutia of the instructions,
could also have been attempting to avoid responsibility for their decision. They could have
been using a close reading of the instructions as a way ofjustifying that the law compelled
them to reach the decision they reached. Researchers who have examined jury delibera-
tions in death penalty cases have noted a tendency among jurors to believe that the law is
compelling them to recommend a sentence of death so that they are absolved of responsi-
bility: They "want to see the law as more responsible than they themselves for the
defendant's punishment. Significantly, this tendency to deny full responsibility for the de-
fendant's punishment appears to make it easier for jurors to vote for death." William J.
Bowers, The Capital Jury: Is It Tilted Toward Death, 79JUDICATuRE 220, 223 (1996) (citation
omitted).
78. See supra text accompanying note 4.
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resisting arrest.v9 However, the press reported nullification as one
of several explanations, and at the very least, attempted to under-
stand how the verdict might have been based on the jurors' honest
beliefs that an acquittal was appropriate or that there was reason-
able doubt.s°
In contrast, in the Simpson case, not only were charges of nulli-
fication more common, at least by many in the mainstream press,
but also there were frequent attacks on the jurors' reasoning ca-
pacity. Although the press noted errors by the prosecution, it
attributed fault largely to the jury. After the Simpson verdict, the
jurors offered reasonable doubt as an explanation;8' however, that
explanation was largely ignored by the mainstream press in favor
of the nullification rationale. After the Koon/Powell verdicts, the
jurors also offered reasonable doubt as an explanation; s3 analysts
and commentators in the mainstream press were more willing to
consider that explanation than in the Simpson case. 4 Moreover,
even those who explained the Koon/Powell verdicts as nullifica-
tion possibly arising out of racial bias did not question the
intelligence and reasoning ability of the jurors. In contrast, in the
Simpson case, there were frequent assertions that the jurors were
emotional, unthinking, and otherwise incompetent. 5 With the
Simpson verdict, it remained unspoken that the charge of incom-
petence was linked to the jurors' race: Either the jurors were
incapable of engaging in reasoned decisionmaking because of
their race or because they were blinded by their racial connection
to Simpson.
The characteristics attributed to the act of nullification in the
Simpson case-lack of juror competence and reasoning capacity
and a tendency to rely on emotions-are stereotypes that have
79. See, e.g., Stolberg, supra note 68, at 8A ("Jurors also felt that the officers acted
within the scope of police department regulations and were justifiably in fear as they at-
tempted to arrest King.").
80. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
81. See discussion supra Part I.A.3.a.
82. See discussion supra Part I.A.1.
83. See discussion supra Part I.B.3.a.
84. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
85. One commentator summarized the situation of the Simpson jurors as follows: "In
Los Angeles, jurors in the O.J. Simpson case continue to explain, defend and withstand
criticism that second-guesses their not-guilty verdict and questions their intelligence." Rivera
Live, supra note 31 (quoting fill-in host Sheila Stainback); see, e.g., Unreasonable Doubt, NEW
REPUBLIC, Oct. 23, 1995, at 7, 8 ("One of the painful lessons of the Simpson verdict is that
the representative jury is fatally undermined when jurors in criminal cases are selected by
attorneys for their ignorance and credulity and hermetic isolation from civil society.... It's
significant, and typical, that only two of the twelve jurors were college graduates."); Wil-
liams, supra note 12, at A5 (recounting and criticizing George Will's view that the jury was
"'intellectually incapable' of following the 'evidentiary argument'").
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long been used to depict African Americans. 6 In this sense, then,
nullification was used as a code word to express stereotypical views
that the mainstream press might not otherwise voice about this
largely African-American jury. By describing thejury as nullifying,
but re-defining nullification to include stereotypes used to deni-
grate African Americans, such as lack of reasoning capacity, the
press was able to use the language of law to denigrate the jury
based largely on its race."'
B. False Claims Unnecessarily Challenge a Community'sJudgment
A jury verdict is a judgment by the community. In a criminal
case, it is a judgment about the defendant's guilt or innocence. If,
while reaching a verdict of not guilty, an act of actual nullification
occurs, questions are raised about the jury's judgment: Did the jury
86. Such stereotypes have a long history in this country. As Dorothy Roberts ex-
plained:
The men who crafted the nation's government, such as Thomas Jefferson, claimed
that Blacks lacked the capacity for rational thought, independence, and self-control
that was essential for self-governance. Racist thinking dictates that Black bodies, intel-
lect, character, and culture are all inherently vulgar. It reflects a pattern of
oppositional categories in which whites are associated with positive characteristics
(industrious, intelligent, responsible), while Blacks are associated with the opposite,
negative qualities (lazy, ignorant, shiftless).
DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING
OF LIBERTY 8-9 (1997) (citations omitted).
According to Henry Louis Gates, in the eighteenth century, when "reason was privi-
leged ... above all other human characteristics," and writing "was taken to be the visible sign
of reason," blacks would be considered "'reasonable,' " and therefore, human beings, only
if they could demonstrate mastery of "'the arts and sciences.'" Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Edi-
tor's Introduction: Writing "Race" and the Difference It Makes; in "RACE," WRITING, AND
DIFFERENCE 1, 8 (Henry Louis Gates,Jr. ed., 1986).
87. See Rosetta Miller-Perry, From the Publisher's Desk: Simpson Case Reflection on Nation's
Racial Climate, TENN. TRIB. (Nashville), Oct. 19, 1995, at 3, available in 1995 WL 15505599
("Many whites see the Simpson jury as rampant evidence that blacks are incapable of objec-
tive thought or rational analysis, and refuse to even consider the possibility that members of
their race commit crimes. There were cries of '[jury] nullification .... "); Williams, supra
note 12, at A5 ("George Will dares to insinuate that inner city Blacks are intellectually inca-
pable of performing credi [ble] jury service.").
88. See, e.g., Knight, supra note 17, at NI ("'I don't think the verdict was racially moti-
vated, but I think the criticism of this jury is racially motivated.'") (quoting Robert B.
Hirschhorn of Cathy E. Bennett & Associates Inc., a jury consulting firm in Galveston,
Texas); Harvey A. Silverglate, Simpson Jury Sends a Subtle Message on Race, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 16,
1995, at A21 ("Many of those attacking the verdict as a product of 'racial politics' rather
than reason and evidence are themselves guilty of making assumptions not based on the
evidence.").
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actjustly? Was it swayed by impermissible biases? Did the jury over-
step its bounds? A false claim of nullification raises additional
questions, including questions about those making the false claim:
Why are they claiming that the jury nullified? Why do they distrust
the jury? Why do they seek to challenge its judgment? The com-
munity's divisions are further exacerbated when the jury is seen as
consisting largely of one group and those casting doubt on the
verdict, through false claims of nullification, belong to another
group.
Thus, a false claim of nullification can heighten animosity be-
tween groups who might see a verdict very differently.89 In the
Simpson and Koon/Powell verdicts, one's view about whether each
verdict was correct, and about which line of reasoning the jury re-
lied on to reach that verdict, depend on one's own situation in
society.9° Depending on one's race, gender, religion, age, and a
variety of other factors, one is likely to have had certain experi-
ences or certain ways of being perceived or treated by others.9'
89. As one interviewer observed: "I think, for many white people, [the Simpson ver-
dict] ... came as something of a shock, that there is such a racial divide in this country and
such a difference in how two groups of people view this ... situation." Face the Nation, supra
note 39 (quoting host Bob Schieffer); see Caldwell, supra note 20, at GI ("Public reaction to
the Simpson verdict revealed a shocking polarization. Most black Americans approved.
Most white Americans disapproved."); Miller-Perry, supra note 87, at 3 ("The so-called 'case
of the century' is over, and about the only thing that's crystal clear about its impact and
outcome is the racial chasm within this nation.").
90. See Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for
Jury Adjudication, 88 MicH. L. REv. 2348, 2395 (1990) (explaining that jurors offer
"viewpoint-dependent narrative [s]," which may be conflicting, but from which they develop
"an authoritative legal judgment").
91. See, e.g., Martha L. Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing Differences: The Future of
Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. REv. 25, 39-40 (1990) ("[I]n addition to race, class, and
sexual preference, ... age, physical characteristics... , religion, marital status, the level of
male identification .... birth order, motherhood, grandmotherhood, intelligence, rural or
urban existence .... sources of income (self, spouse, or state), degree of poverty or wealth,
and substance dependency... shape how individual women experience the world.")
(citation omitted); Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the
Jury, 73 TEX. L. REv. 1041, 1130 (1995) [hereinafter Marder, Peremptory Challenges]
("[Jurors have different experiences and perspectives that shape the way in which they view
the world.") (citation omitted); Nancy S. Marder, Note, Gender Dynamics and Jury Delibera-
tions, 96 YALE L.J. 593, 604 (1987) [hereinafter Marder, Gender Dynamics] ("Gender, like age
and race, informs one's relations with others and one's experiences and position in soci-
ety.") (citation omitted); see also David Kairys et al., Jury Representativeness: A Mandate for
Multiple Source Lists, 65 CAL. L. REv. 776, 782 n.44 (1977) ("No one is without attitudes and
preferences concerning various social, political, economic, cultural and religious issues, and
such attitudes and preferences affect one's judgment and perception regarding factual and
legal questions and the credibility of witnesses."); Craig L. Jackson, Simpson v. the Sys-
tem/Can't We Accept That Our Perceptions Differ?, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 8, 1995, at 1, available in
1995 WL 9408324 ("Perceptions may differ by geography, socioeconomic status, gender, life
experiences and, believe it or not, race."); Perry, supra note 32, at A5 ("'Everybody brings to
the jury box his life experiences and attitudes .... Those things affect how they evaluate the
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These experiences become, in effect, a lens through which one
judges others, including how much weight one gives to the testi-
mony of police officers or how to balance other credibility
assessments that are made during a trial.92 Thus, it is not surprising
thatjurors with very different life experiences might view the same
evidence very differently.93 The Simi Valley and Los Angeles juries
in the Koon/Powell and Simpson trials, respectively, are likely to
see the world quite differently, as are the communities from which
these jurors were drawn.94 This view, which I will call "different
evidence, the witnesses and even the jury instructions.'") (quoting Beth Bonora, founder of
the Oakland-based National Jury Project); Silverglate, supra note 88, at A21 ("[A]II jurors
bring their experience to bear in deciding which witnesses and evidence to believe or disbe-
lieve-and this is as it should be-but such weighing of credibility is normally done in
complete good faith and in a genuine search for the truth ....").
92. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 37, at C1 ("What is reasonable to a black person may
not be reasonable to a white person, especially in matters involving the police."); Knight,
supra note 17, at NI (explaining the Simpson verdict by pointing out that the African-
American jurors' "real experiences made them more skeptical of police testimony than
white people, and ... white prosecutors.., didn't understand that that would happen")
(paraphrasing George Washington University Law School Professor Paul Butler); Morning
Edition, supra note 36 ("Jurors bring their own life experiences to the evaluation of court-
room evidence.... Blacks and whites have different life experiences, especially when it
comes to the police.... Whites tend to trust the police and believe the prosecution, while
blacks tend to be much more skeptical of law enforcement.") (quoting commentator and
sociology professor Richard Moran); Stolberg, supra note 68, at 8A ("The juror said the
panel [in the beating of Rodney King] found the officers' testimony credible."); Talk Live:
Interview: Guests Discuss the Impact on the Police Department and theJudiciay as a Result of the O.J.
Simpson Trial (CNBC television broadcast, Oct. 23, 1995), available in 1995 WL 2870696
("[W]hen you put... black jurors in the jury box and they bring their own lifetime experi-
ences into that box, and you're going to tell them about police brutality, they know it much
more than a white juror knows it.") (quoting former California Superior Court Judge Jack
Tenner).
93. See, e.g., Caldwell, supra note 20, at G1 ("How is it that we could all have watched
the same events yet come to such diametrically opposed interpretations? Widely divergent
life experiences are obviously part of the answer."); Benjamin A. Holden et al., Racism on
Tria MONTREAL GAZETTE, Oct. 7, 1995, at BI, available in WESTLAW, Paperscan Database
(noting a "greater tendency of many blacks to believe that police will falsify evidence and lie
on the witness stand" and in this way "concentrating on the evidence, but filtering it, as any
juror must, through their own perspectives"); id. ("'It's not just race. It's life experiences.
Blacks are more likely to have been jacked by the police, and less likely to view police testi-
mony with quite the same pristine validity as a white male from the suburbs.' ") (quoting
Robert E. Kalunian, assistant public defender for Los Angeles County).
94. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 91, at 1 ("So why should it surprise anyone, black or
white, that blacks and whites, who have such different life experiences, would have a differ-
ent view of reasonable doubt in a case involving what many consider to be such
overwhelming evidence of guilt, but also such disturbing evidence and/or suggestions of
either police ineptitude or misconduct?"); Paul Richter, Million Man March; Clinton Calls for
End to Racism; Speech: Racial GulfExposed by Simpson Trial Demands Individual Remedy, He Says
LA TIMES, Oct. 17, 1995, at Al (reporting that President Clinton, in his first major speech
on racial issues since the Simpson trial, said that "the Simpson trial had made Americans
aware that whites and blacks see the world in vastly different ways").
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realities/same values, 9 5 assumes that people from different back-
grounds may have different life experiences, and therefore see the
world in very different ways, but will still share core values. For ex-
ample, they will agree that murder is wrong ("same value"), but
may disagree about whether particular police conduct in a case is
excessive or part of the job depending on their own experiences
with police officers and whether they see them as harassers or pro-
tectors ("different realities").
When people from different backgrounds or communities in-
terpret a verdict quite differently, the verdict becomes a lightning
rod for existing societal divisions. Of course, not everyone in a
community might agree on how to interpret a verdict, and people
are likely to see themselves as belonging to multiple communi-
• 96
ties. Nonetheless, race seemed to be the predominant lens
through which many viewed these verdicts, or at least it was the
predominant lens through which journalists and pollsters reported
the cases. 97 At least as expressed in polls, many whites viewed the'
95. Although I think these categories are useful, I do not mean to suggest that they are
entirely distinct. I believe one's values can shape how one perceives the world and how one
perceives the world can shape one's values.
96. See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politic's 1989 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 139 (contrasting the "multidimensionality of Black women's experience
with the single-axis analysis that distorts these experiences" and that perpetuates "the ten-
dency to treat race and gender as mutually exclusive categories of experience and analysis")
(citation omitted); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 581, 608 (1990) (arguing that African-American women should not have to choose
whether they are African Americans first or women first, but should be able to recognize
themselves as "multiplicitous").
97. Race, of course, is not limited to just black and white, see, e.g., Brian Chin, Letter to
the Editor, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1995, at M4 ("The media is so focused on black and white
opinions on O.J. Why haven't the media polled Southern Californians who are neither?"),
but with these verdicts, the divide, as reported in polls and by the press, seemed to be black
and white.
Public opinion polls showed "blacks overwhelmingly thought Mr. Simpson was not guilty
and whites thought he was." Editorial, Not Guilty, supra note 37, at 18A; seeJulian Beltrame &
Scott Shepard, O.J. Simpson Verdict Divides Americans; Not Guilty: Blacks Cheer, Whites Lament
Jury Decision, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Oct. 4, 1995, at Al, available in WESTLAW, Paperscan Data-
base ("A poll taken by CBS News immediately after the verdict found that about 6 in 10
whites believed the wrong verdict was reached, while 9 in 10 blacks said the jury had come
to the right conclusion."); Editorial, Simpson Jury Reached a Verdict; That's Progress, ATLANTA
J.-CoNsT., Oct. 4, 1995, at A12, available in 1995 WL 6554412 ("[M]ost whites believ[e]
Simpson guilty and most blacks believ[e] him innocent."); Editorial, The Simpson Case: Black
and White Justice, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 4, 1995, at A18, available in 1995 WL 5301366
("According to polls, 77 percent of whites were certain Simpson was guilty, while 72 percent
of blacks believed him an innocent victim of a frame-up by the Los Angeles Police Depart-
ment, in the person of the racist detective Mark Fuhrman."); Ambrose Evans-Pritchard,
Focus After the O.J Trial, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Oct. 8, 1995, at 36, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Telegr File ("According to the latest Time/CNN poll, 62 per cent of
whites think that OJ got away with murder, compared to only 14 per cent of blacks."); Vin-
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Simpson verdict as the result of nullification,9" whereas many Afri-
can Americans viewed it as the result of reasonable doubt.99 After
the Koon/Powell trial, the verdicts were criticized by both whites
and African Americans, 0 0 but whites seemed far more willing to
believe that the jury was acting in good faith, 1' whereas African
•aIft 102
Americans rejected the verdict as racist.
The newspaper coverage of both the Simpson and Koon/Powell
verdicts assumed an alternative view to the "different reali-
ties/same values" view described above; the press coverage
assumed a view I will call "same reality/different values." In other
words, the press assumed that jurors and those outside the jury
room saw the same facts ("same reality") in both the Simpson and
Koon/Powell trials, but that jurors chose to reach a result contrary
to the facts because of "different values." With the Simpson verdict,
the mainstream press assumed the jurors chose to let a murderer
go free in order to send a message to the police or to white Amer-
ica ("different values"), and with the Koon/Powell verdict, the
mainstream press assumed the jurors chose to let the police offi-
cers go free because of the trust they had in the police and the
disdain they had for the victim ("different values").
cent F.A. Golphin, The Juice'Is Loose: But O.J. Might Never Be Free, ABOUT ... TIME, Oct. 31,
1995, at 44, available in 1995 WL 15265571 (noting that "as many as 81 percent of whites
polled disagree" with the Simpson verdict); Miller-Perry, supra note 87, at 3 ("[M]ore than
three-quarters of all whites interviewed in various polls, regardless of gender, income or
educational levels, felt Simpson was guilty and had gotten a break from a predominantly
black jury. Over 90 percent of all blacks interviewed felt Simpson was innocent.... ."); Ro-
sen, supra note 12, at 35 ("After the trial, polls of the general public revealed that up to 80
percent of African Americans thought that Simpson was innocent."); Silverglate, supra note
88, at A21 ("[P]re-verdict polls indicated that the overwhelming number of black citizens
thought Mr. Simpson innocent (or at least felt that he should be acquitted) while a like
percentage of whites felt to the contrary .. ");Jeffrey Toobin, PuttingIt in Black and White,
NEw YORKER, July 17, 1995, at 31 ("A recent Harris poll found that sixty per cent of whites
believe Simpson is guilty, compared with only twelve per cent of African-Americans."); Un-
reasonable Doubt, supra note 85, at 8 ("[W]e need not repeat the polls that show
overwhelming differences between how whites and blacks viewed the [Simpson] case."). But
see Rosen, supra note 12, at 35 ("[T]he essentialism of race was shown to be diversified by
gender and class.... [Cilass envy, rather than shared experiences of racial and gender
oppression, turned out to be the most important predictor ofjuror sympathies.").
98. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 13, at BI ("'I guarantee you in the white households
in this country, [the Simpson verdict] is seen very clearly as jury nullification.'") (quoting
Toby Vick, Henrico County's Commonwealth's Attorney, discussing racism and gender bias
in Virginia courtrooms).
99. See, e.g., Betsy Streisand et al., The Verdict's Aftermath, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Oct. 16, 1995, at 34 (noting that a U.S. News survey by pollsters Celinda Lake and Ed Goeas
"found that 7 out of 10 blacks felt the jury acquitted Simpson on the basis of facts and law,
while 53 percent of whites thought 'other factors' were involved in its decision").
100. See supra notes 48-50.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 60-68.
102. See supra note 69.
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If the mainstream press had espoused a "different realities/same
values" view, it would have devoted coverage to exploring how an-
other group saw a different reality based upon its different
experiences. Instead, the mainstream press believed that jurors saw
the same reality but simply held different values, and therefore,
the press used nullification as a way of explaining what otherwise
seemed to be untenable jury decisions. Under the "same real-
ity/different values" view, other groups are seen not just as
"different," as the "different realities/same values" view holds, but
as dangerous because there are no common values. Thus, this view
not only leads to claims of false nullification, but also threatens the
jury system itself, because if there are no shared values then it is
difficult to see how a diverse jury can deliberate and reach com-
mon ground or how the verdict of a non-diverse jury will ever
achieve acceptance by groups other than the one represented on
the jury.
C. False Claims Encourage Intervention
1. Judicial Intervention-As the press and public criticize jury
verdicts for being instances of nullification in cases that do not ac-
tually involve nullification, judges have begun to respond to a
growing fear that nullification is increasingly prevalent. Their re-
sponse entails greater judicial control of the jury in an attempt to
reduce instances of nullification, which they view as a threat to the
judicial system. 10
3
Recently, the Second Circuit created new procedures for trial
judges to follow in an effort to limit instances of jury nullification.
In United States v. Thomas,10 4 the court placed the trial judge in the
position of judging the juror's intention to nullify, at least in cases
in which such intent is brought to the judge's attention. 105 In such
103. See, e.g., StephenJ. Adler, Courtroom Putsch ?Jurors Should Reject Laws They Don't Like,
Activist Group Argues, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 1991, at Al (quoting Federal Judge William
Schwarzer, then Director of the Federal Judicial Center, who described nullification as pro-
ducing "chaos and lawlessness"); Bruce Fein,Judge, Jury... and the Sixth, WASH. TIMES, Nov.
8, 1990, at G3, available in 1990 WL 3813582 ("'The jury is not a minidemocracy or a mini-
legislature. They are not to go back and do right as they see fit. That's anarchy. They are
supposed to follow the law.'") (quoting Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson, commenting on
the jury verdict in the trial of former Washington, D.C. Mayor Marion Barry, in which he
was acquitted of the most serious charges).
104. 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 1997).
105. See id. at 617 ("[A] presiding judge possesses both the responsibility and the
authority to dismiss a juror whose refusal or unwillingness to follow the applicable law be-
comes known to the judge during the course of trial.").
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cases, the trial judge is to question the juror to determine if that
juror is truly intent upon nullifying.0 6 If so, that juror is to be dis-
missed from the jury, even if the jury is in the midst of
deliberations. 
107
Although the appellate court briefly acknowledged that jurors
may nullify for a variety of reasons and that nullification may not
always be harmful, 8 overall it was highly critical of nullification.
Because nullification represents a "violation of a juror's oath to
apply the law as instructed by the court," the appellate court
"categorically reject[ed] the idea that, in a society committed to
the rule of law, jury nullification is desirable or that courts may
permit it to occur when it is within their authority to prevent."'0 9
In People v. Sanchez,"0 a California appellate court also supported
a trial judge's efforts to limit a jury's opportunity to nullify."' The
jury had asked the trial judge whether it could consider a lesser
offense;" 2 the trial judge informed the jury that it could not."l9 The
106. See id. (explaining that a court has "inherent authority to conduct inquiries in re-
sponse to reports of improper juror conduct and to determine whether ajuror is unwilling
to carry out his duties faithfully and impartially").
107. See id. at 618 ("[T]he need to safeguard the secrecy ofjury deliberations requires
the use of a high evidentiary standard for the dismissal of a deliberating juror for purposeful
disobedience of a court's instructions .. "). For a fuller discussion of the dangers posed by
the Second Circuit's approach in Thomas, see Marder, Myth, supra note 4.
108. See Thomas, 116 F.3d at 614-16 (recognizing "that nullification may at times mani-
fest itself as a form of civil disobedience that some may regard as tolerable" and mentioning
the case of John Peter Zenger, acquitted of criminal libel in 1735, and the nineteenth cen-
tury acquittals of fugitive slaves as "perhaps our country's most renowned examples of
'benevolent' nullification").
109. Id. at 614. The Second Circuit is not alone in its condemnation of jury nullifica-
tion; other federal circuits have taken a similar view. See United States v. Perez, 86 F.3d 735,
736 (7th Cir. 1996) ("An unreasonable jury verdict, although unreviewable if it is an acquit-
tal, is lawless, and the defendant has no right to invite the jury to act lawlessly."); United
States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam). The court in Wash-
ington stated:
Ajury has no more 'right'to find a 'guilty' defendant 'not guilty' than it has to find a
'not guilty' defendant 'guilty,' and the fact that the former cannot be corrected by a
court, while the latter can be, does not create a right out of the power to misapply
the law. Such verdicts are lawless, a denial of due process and constitute an exercise
of erroneously seized power.
Id.
110. 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
111. See id. at 20-22.
112. See Tr. at 763-67, People v. Sanchez, No. B104533 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County
1997). The jury asked the judge: "'Can we arrive at a verdict where we find the defendant
guilty of robbery/second degree murder?'" and the judge responded: "'The answer to that
is no. To begin with, robbery is not charged.... The only issue is whether the defendant is
guilty of murder. Id. at 763-64.
113. See id.
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trial judge went further, however, and explicitly instructed the jury
that not only did it have to follow the law, but also that any juror
who felt unable to do so would be excused by the judge even
though the jury was already in the midst of deliberations.14 The
trial judge's response to the jury was upheld on appeal."15 Typically,
trial judges remain silent on the jury's power to nullify;"' in this
114. See id. at 767. The judge instructed the jury:
Now I've explained the reason for the felony murder rule and if after thinking about
it any of you feel that if you did find the defendant committed a robbery and in the
commission or attempted commission of it he committed a murder and are reluctant
to follow the law that says that's first degree murder, I want you to tell me, and I'll
excuse you fromjury service because you're not following the law.
Id.
115. See Sanchez, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22 ("Accordingly, we are bound to conclude the
trial court was not required to instruct the jurors on their power of nullification and permit
them to disregard the law." (citation omitted)).
116. The federal circuits do not permit an instruction on nullification. See United States
v. Thomas, 116 F.3d at 606, 616 n.9 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Accordingly, criminal defendants have
no right to a jury instruction alerting jurors to this power to act in contravention of their
duty." (citations omitted)); United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1190 (1st Cir. 1993)
("Though jury nullification has a long and sometimes storied past the case law makes plain
that ajudge may not instruct anent its history, vitality, or use." (citations omitted)); United
States v. Powell, 955 F.2d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Our circuit's precedent indicates that
the [defendants] are not entitled to jury nullification instructions." (citation omitted));
United States v. Krzyske, 836 F.2d 1013, 1021 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[W]e are compelled to ap-
prove the district court's refusal to discuss jury nullification with the jury. To have given an
instruction on nullification would have undermined the impartial determination of justice
based on law."); United States v. Anderson, 716 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 1983) ("We agree
with Judge Lev[e]nthal's capsulization of the necessary historical tension which is not to be
collapsed by explicit nullification instructions ... ."); United States v. Trujillo, 714 F.2d 102,
106 (11th Cir. 1983) ("While we recognize that ajury may render a verdict at odds with the
evidence or the law, neither the court nor counsel should encourage jurors to violate their
oath."); United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("[T]he district
court's absolute refusal to instruct the jury [on nullification] as requested was entirely
proper."); United States v. Desmond, 670 F.2d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 1982) ("Thus, although
acknowledging the existence of the jury's prerogative and its beneficial role in acting as a
'safety valve,' the courts do not encourage exercise of the right."); United States v. Buttorff,
572 F.2d 619, 627 (8th Cir. 1978) ("A defendant is not entitled to ajury nullification instruc-
tion." (citation omitted)); United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1006 (4th Cir. 1969)
("[B]y clearly stating to the jury that they may disregard the law .... we would indeed be
negating the rule of law in favor of the rule of lawlessness."); see also Washington v. Watkins,
655 F.2d 1346, 1374 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981) ("The courts that have considered the
question, however, have almost uniformly held that a criminal defendant is not entitled to
an instruction that points up the existence of that practical power [to nullify] to his jury."
(citations omitted)).
Only two states, Indiana and Maryland, permit judges to instruct jurors that they have the
fight to determine the law as well as the facts. These two states' respective constitutions
provide for this fight. See IND. CONST. art. 1, § 19 ("In all criminal cases whatsoever, the jury
shall have the right to determine the law and the facts."); MD. CONST. DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS art. 23 ("In the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well
as of fact, except that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a
conviction."). However, in both states, the judiciary has narrowed this right through case
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instance, the judge took a more proactive stance and asserted that
the power did not exist.
2. Proposed Legislative Intervention-Labeling a verdict as an in-
stance of nullification, even if it is not actual nullification, also can
contribute to a public sense of despair about the jury and fuel leg-
islative efforts to limit the jury's power. After the Koon/Powell and
Simpson verdicts, there were legislative proposals to constrain the
jury and to make convictions easier to obtain. One proposal de-
bated in the California state legislature"7 and the press"' called for
abandoning the unanimity requirement in criminal trials"9 and
switching to an 11-1 or 10-2 decision rule. 20 The intent was to
make it easier for juries to convict12' and more difficult for one or
law. See, e.g., Beavers v. State, 141 N.E.2d 118, 125 (Ind. 1957) ("Although the constitution
gives the jury the right to determine the law in criminal cases, it does not follow... that it is
an 'exclusive' right.... Neither does it follow .. . that the jury is the judge of the law at
every step in the proceedings."); Montgomery v. State, 437 A.2d 654, 656 (Md. 1981)
("'[T]he jury's role in judging the law under Article 23 is confined 'to resolv[ing] conflicting
interpretations of the law [of the crime] and to decid[ing] whether th[at] law should be applied
in dubious factual situations,' and nothing more."' (quoting Stevenson v. State, 423 A.2d 558,
564 (Md. 1980); Dillon v. State, 357 A.2d 360, 367 (Md. 1976))).
117. See, e.g., Assembly Const. Amend. 18, 1995 Cal. Sess. ("This measure would provide
that in a criminal action in which either a felony or misdemeanor is charged, 5/6 of the jury
may render a verdict, but if the death penalty is sought, only a unanimous jury may render a
verdict."); Senate Const. Amend. 24, 1995 Cal. Sess. ("This measure would provide that
11/12 of the jury may render a verdict in any criminal action except an action in which the
death penalty is sought or in which a defendant may be sentenced to a term of imprison-
ment for life without the possibility of parole.").
118. See, e.g., California Blue Ribbon Panel Urges Wide Range ofJury Reforms, WEST'S LEGAL
NEWS, May 3, 1996, available in 1996 WL 260677 (announcing the Judicial Council's Blue
Ribbon Commission proposals for jury reform, which included a recommendation for
nonunanimous verdicts); Greg Krikorian, Committee Hearing a Trial by Fire for the Juy System,
LA. TIMES, July 28, 1995, at 3 (describing a proposal by State Senator Charles Calderon,
Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, which "would allow 11-1 verdicts in all but capital
cases");Jason L. Riley, Rule of Law: Should aJuy Verdict Be Unanimous?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22,
1995, at All (recounting California District Attorneys Association's proposal to amend the
state's constitution to allow for nonunanimousjuries); Wilson Touts Jury Reform, Cites Simpson
Trial L.A. DAILY NEWS, July 18, 1995, at N4, available in 1995 WL 5411715 ("[Governor
Pete] Wilson told a group of prosecuting attorneys.., that he supports a bill ... that would
allow criminal convictions on a 10-2 vote ofjurors in all but death penalty cases.").
119. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 16 ("Trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured
to all, but in a civil cause three-fourths of the jury may render a verdict.").
120. See supra notes 117-18.
121. One jury scholar, Professor Valerie Hans, has noted that public dissatisfaction with
juries may stem from a "very strong" belief that "courts are not doing enough to punish
wrongdoers." Laura Mansnerus, Under Fire, Jury System Faces Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,
1995, at A9 (quoting Hans). Recent cases that incensed the public, such as "Rodney King,
Bobbitt, Menendez, [and] Simpson" were all "prodefendant decision[s]," and in Professor
Hans' view, would not have been as controversial "if these juries were convicting." Id.; see also
Mark Curriden,Jury Reform, A.B.A.J., Nov. 1995, at 72 ("'When people are acquitted in crimi-
nal cases, there is a tendency to say that the system is broke and needs fixing.'" (quoting
Victor "Tory" Johnson, Vice President of the National District Attorneys Association));
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two jurors, who may be advocating nullification or some other out-
sider position, to create a hung jury,2 2 which adds costs and delays.
Although this proposal would affect the jury where one or two ju-
rors were holding out and urging nullification, it would not affect
the jury where all of the jurors believed that nullification was ap-
propriate. Ironically, this proposal would not have affected the
very jury that inspired it, the Simpson jury,12 which was unanimous
in its verdict of acquittal.14 Nor is there any indication that hung
juries, which comprise a small percentage of all tried cases in Cali-
fornia,12 5 are really a problem that needs to be addressed. What
seemed to motivate proponents of this proposal was an underlying
distrust ofjurors in general and, perhaps, an underlying distrust of
minority jurors or those who might come from a different back-
ground and offer a different perspective in particular. 2 6 If all
Christopher Johns, Opinion, Jury Overhaul Needed, Now More Than Ever, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr.
12, 1995, at B5, available in 1995 WL 2784405 ("Sensational cases seem to cause most of the
public's frustration with the jury system .... ").
122. California was considering moving from a unanimity requirement in criminal
cases to 10-2 or 11-1 juries, in part to save money and in part to "lessen the number of
hungjuries" in criminal cases. Riley, supra note 118, at All.
123. SeeJan Crawford Greenburg & Ginger Orr, Simpson Trial Yields a Verdict Against the
System, NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.), Oct. 8, 1995, at Fl ("State legislators in California have
responded to the [Simpson] trial by introducing legislation to change the jury system....
[One change] would do away with the requirement that juries be unanimous in their deci-
sions."); Editorial, The O.J. Simpson Case: A Legal Aberration, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 7, 1995, at A18,
available in 1995 WL 5301997 ("The Simpson trial and verdict ha[ve] given rise to a host of
quick-fix proposals to reform the courts, including one particularly misguided notion to
replace unanimous jury verdicts with 10-to-2 decisions."); Whitaker, supra note 16, at 34
("[D]isgust over the Simpson outcome might simply leave whites determined to make it
more difficult for black juries to acquit black defendants. Prospects suddenly brightened for
a California amendment that would allow 'non-majority' verdicts of 10-2 .... ).
124. In an initial vote, the jury in O.J. Simpson's trial was 10-2 for an acquittal; soon af-
ter, it took a second vote, in which it was unanimous for acquittal. See Lorraine Adams,
Simpson Jurors Cite Weak Case, Not 'Race Card, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1995, at Al; Edward J.
Boyer & Elaine Woo, Case Had Many Holes, Juror Says, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at Al; Julia
Campbell, At First Shy of Publicity, Juror No. 4 Speaks Out, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1995, at A15;
Egan, supra note 34 A1;Jim Newton, Simpson Not Guilty, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at A10.
125. See, e.g., Roger Parloff, Race andJuries: If It Ain't Broke .... A.BA.J., June 1997, at 5
("[TIhere is no evidence that hung-jury rates in Los Angeles have risen one iota in more
than a decade."). Parloff notes that, according to Los Angeles superior court figures, hung
jury rates were about 15 percent in 1985, and have remained fairly steady since, with a low
of 12 percent in 1991, 1993, and 1994. See id. Parloff, re-examining data collected by Kalven
and Zeisel in 1956, concludes that Los Angeles' hung jury rate in that year was 13 percent,
which is consistent with today's figures. See id. But see CALIFORNIA DIST. ATTORNEYS, NON-
UNANIMOUSJURY VERDICTS: A NECESSARY CRIMINALJUSTICE REFORM i, ii (1995) (reporting
California hung jury rates of approximately 10%). This publication also reported hung jury
rates for Los Angeles County of 13-14% between 1992 and 1994, see id. at 7, and of rates for
five large California counties ranging from 13% to 8%. See id. at 12.
126. This view would certainly be consistent with other signs of hostility toward minori-
ties in California, including Proposition 187 (visited Feb. 22, 1999)
<http://ca94.election.digital.com/e/prop/187/txt.html> (ending government services to
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jurors have to listen to each other and reach consensus during de-
liberations, there is a greater risk that convictions would not follow
in the numbers that the press, public, and legislature demanded. 
27
This proposal reflected an underlying view of jurors that was both
belittling and cynical-belittling in that all of the jurors could not
be trusted to deliberate responsibly and should not have to listen
to each other or spend additional time trying to persuade those
among them who might have reasonable doubts, and cynical be-
cause, just as efforts have been made to make juries more
diverse-from multiple venire lists 28 to nondiscriminatory peremp-
tories'2 -- this was an effort to minimize, if not undermine, the
those who could not establish that they were in this country legally) and Proposition 209
(visited Feb. 22, 1999) <http://vote96.ss.ca.gov/BP/209text.htm> (ending affirmative ac-
tion in schools). According to former Democratic Assemblyman Phillip Isenberg,
California's recent "anti-immigrant and ... anti-affirmative action assaults are the most
ignoble and, tragically, will probably caricature [Pete Wilson's] administration." Cathleen
Decker, The Wilson Paradox: Little Political Gain from Success, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1998, at Al.
127. See supra note 121.
128. Some commentators have noted that when venire lists are drawn only from voter
registration lists, the representativeness of the venire is compromised. See, e.g., Kairys et. al,
supra note 91, at 803-11. To overcome this problem, commentators have suggested sup-
plementing voter registration lists with multiple lists, such as lists of those who have driver's
licenses or receive unemployment compensation. See id.; Dennis Bilecki, Program Improves
Minority Group Representation on Federal Juries, 77 JUDICATURE 221, 222 (1994)
(recommending the use of driver's license and identification card registration records as a
supplement to voter registration records to expand jury pools to include minority groups
that have been underrepresented in the past). Other commentators have explored
"stratified selection" in which prospective jurors for the venire are summoned proportion-
ally "to obtain a qualified list with racial demographics identical to that of the population."
NancyJ. King & G. Thomas Munsterman, Stratified Juror Selection: Cross-Section ly Design, 79
JUDICATURE 273, 276 (1996). But see United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092, 1109 (6th Cir.
1998) (holding the practice violative of 28 U.S.C. § 1862 and the equal protection compo-
nent of the Fifth Amendment).
129. This is the goal of the Supreme Court's decisions in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986) (holding that a prosecutor's use of peremptories to strike African Americans from
the jury violated the Equal Protection Clause), and its progeny, seeJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (holding that peremptories exercised on the basis of gender vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (holding that
Batson applies to defendants as well as to the prosecution); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (holding that Batson applies to civil suits); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.
400 (1991) (holding that peremptories exercised on the basis of race violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause), even though the Court seems to have done some backsliding since then. See
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curiam) (holding that a neutral explanation
given in response to a Batson challenge need not be "'related to the particular case to be
tried"' (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98)).
The Court's earlier efforts notwithstanding, discriminatory peremptories continue to be
prevalent. See Developments in the Law--The Civilury, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1408, 1462 & nn.17 7 - 7 8
(1997). As a result, some have called for the elimination of the peremptory, see, e.g., Batson, 476
U.S. at 107-08 (Marshall,J., concurring) (suggesting that the Court "ban[] the use of peremp-
tory challenges by prosecutors and ... allow[] the States to eliminate the defendant's
peremptories as well"); Minetos v. City Univ., 925 F. Supp. 177, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("It is time
to put an end to this charade. We have now had enough judicial experience with the Batson
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effects of diversity in the jury room.'30 Other reforms that were dis-
cussed in the wake of the Simpson verdict included changing jury
selection 3' and, in the case of trials with complicated evidence,
eliminating the jury.132 According to one writer, "[t]he net effect
.. would make it harder to win acquittal.'
33
What these judicial and legislative responses reveal is a distrust
of the jury in general and of nullification in particular. False claims
of nullification contribute to that distrust. False claims make nulli-
fication appear far more prevalent than it is, and thus, make
nullification appear to be a problem that needs to be addressed by
these other governmental actors. False claims also heighten misgiv-
ings about the jury, spurring judges and legislators to consider
ways that jury power may be reduced. Although false claims alone
are not responsible for these responses to the jury, they contribute
to a growing sense that reforms are required.
III. FALSE CLAIMS AND DIVERSE JURIES
A. Past Steps Taken to Achieve Diverse Juries
False claims of nullification are a means of discrediting verdicts,
at least in the public's view, and ultimately they may also be a way
of wresting power from juries. This effort to undermine a verdict
may be linked to who can now serve on a jury. At one point in this
country's history, only white men with property were eligible to
test to know that it does not truly unmask discrimination."); JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE
JURY 137-39 (1994); Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptoy Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial
Judge's Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 810, 850 (1997); Marder, Peremptory Challenges,
supra note 91, at 1044-47, 1052-86, 1095-99. Others have recommended a reduction in the
number of peremptories, seeJean Montoya, The Future of the Post-Batson Peremptoy Challenge:
Voir Dire by Questionnaire and the "Blind" Peremptory, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 981, 1011 &
n.144 (citing scholars and commentators who have made this proposal) (1996), or at least
peremptories that are exercised by questionnaire, rather than voir dire, so that attorneys
will not have access to information that is likely to lead to discriminatory peremptories. See
id. at 1015-16.
130. See, e.g., Parloff, supra note 125, at 74 ("[Some] critics would charge, in fact, that
the nonunanimous system had been designed ... in deference to white fears that black
jurors could not be trusted to exercise their civic duty, and to white intuitions that their own
assessments of police credibility were instrinsically [sic] superior to black jurors' assessments
of police credibility.").
131. SeeRichard Goldstein, O.J. Can You See?, VILLAGE VOICE, Oct. 17, 1995, at 18.
132. See id.
133. Id.
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serve as jurors. In 1880, in Strauder v. West Virginia,13 the Su-
preme Court held that a statute excluding African-American men
from jury service on the basis of their race violated the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution,136 and in 1975, in
Taylor v. Louisiana, 37 the Court held that automatic exemption of
women from juries because of their gender violated a defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to a venire drawn from a fair cross section
of the community. Although there is no constitutional right to a
• 139
petit jury that mirrors the community, prospective jurors can no
longer be excluded from the venire because of their race or gen-
der. At least since 1986, in Batson v. Kentucky
1 40 and its progeny,141
race and gender can no longer be used as the basis for the exercise
of a peremptory challenge,1 42 past use of which had served as a bar
to placement on a petit jury. The Supreme Court has tried to en-
sure, albeit with questionable success,13  that peremptory
challenges are not used as an alternate route to exclude prospec-
tive jurors from jury service based on race or gender. On a more
local level, courts have tried to identify eligible jurors from multi-
ple venire lists, 45 so that failure to register to vote, for example, is
134. See Marder, Peremptory Challenges, supra note 91, at 1094 (citation omitted). As one
writer has noted, "the racially mixed deliberative body in 'Voir Dire' [a 1995 play by Joe
Sutton] (four whites, one black and one Latino) epitomizes the demise of the all-white, all-
male urban jury depicted in 'Twelve Angry Men."' Misha Berson, Trial by Jury: Seattle Rep
Play Takes a Timely Look at Justice, OJ-Style, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 8, 1995, at M1, available in
WESTLAW, SH-Times Database.
135. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
136. See id. at 310.
137. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
138. See id. at 533.
139. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 494 (1990).
140. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that a prosecutorial peremptory challenge based on
race was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution).
141. See cases cited supra note 129.
142. See id.
143. See discussion supra note 129; see also Marder, Peremptory Challenges, supra rote 91, at
1095, 1098-99 (arguing that discriminatory peremptories will not be eliminated until all
peremptories are eliminated).
144. See generallyJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994); Georgia v. McCol-
lum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); Powers
v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991); Batson, 476 U.S. at 79. But see Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765,
768 (1995) (per curiam) (allowing a prosecutor to satisfy step two of the Batson inquiry-of
providing a race-neutral explanation for a peremptory-with an explanation that is "silly or
superstitious").
145. See, e.g., Bilecki, supra note 128, at 220-21; Kairys et al., supra note 91, at 780; G.
Thomas Munsterman & Paula L. Hannaford, Reshaping the Bedrock of Democracy: American Jury
Reform During the Last 30 Years, JUDGES' J., Fall 1997, at 6 ("A widely used technique was to
supplement voter registration lists with lists of licensed drivers. More recently, states have
added unemployment compensation[] recipients, welfare recipients, and state and local
income tax filers as supplemental source lists." (citation omitted)); Berson, supra note 134,
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no longer a basis for exclusion from jury service. The relatively re-
cent removal of these legal and practical impediments has meant
that, for the first time in our country's history, juries can be truly
diverse.
B. False Claims as a Response to Backsliding
With this potential for diversity, it would not be surprising to
find a concomitant readiness to make false claims of nullification
whenever juries appear to fall short of this ideal. If a jury does not
look diverse, then those outside the jury room become increas-
ingly wary about trusting that jury's judgment. One way to discredit
the judgment is to label it as nullification, whether actual or false.
This may help to explain the use of nullification in the Simpson
verdict.
Whereas the Simpson jury was discredited because it consisted
largely of African Americans, 14 the Koon/Powell jury was discred-
ited because it consisted largely of whites. 4 7 When a particular jury
is not diverse, those who are members of the excluded groups are
likely to make false claims of nullification or to reject the criminal
justice system altogether. The Koon/Powell verdict was also re-
jected by many whites who distrusted a verdict reached by a
homogeneous jury drawn from an insulated community. Thus, a
verdict is likely to be questioned, and the claim of nullification
made, even falsely, when a verdict is arrived at by ajury that is not
seen as drawn from a fair cross section of the community. This was
true of both the Koon/Powell and Simpson verdicts, though for
each verdict different communities were included and excluded.'
4
False claims of nullification, then, can serve as a means of discred-
iting the jury by those objecting to its homogeneity and suspecting
that it reached its judgment through impermissible group consid-
S149
erations.
at MI (noting that, in the State of Washington, "any adult licensed by the Department of
Motor Vehicles is eligible to receive ajury summons-representing a far wider cross-section
of the public").
146. See supra text accompanying note 12.
147. See supra note 46.
148. Compare supra text accompanying note 12 with supra note 46.
149. After the Koon/Powell verdicts, one attorney described the exclusion of African
Americans fromjuries as follows:
'In terms ofjury selection, Blacks are clearly losing ground when it comes to being
allowed to sit as the factual judges of innocence or guilt. We are at a point when jus-
tice is still peeping from under the blindfold that she is supposed to be wearing, and
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C. Diverse Juries as a Deterrent to False Claims
A diverse jury is needed to guard against false claims of nullifica-
tion. With a diverse jury, those outside the jury room will have
more faith in the verdict rendered by that jury and will have less
reason to resort to false claims of nullification. They will harbor
fewer suspicions that perhaps jurors succumbed to impermissible
biases, such as sympathy for the defendant if they belong to the
same group or animosity toward the defendant if they belong to a
different group. If the jury is diverse, and its members are drawn
from an array of different groups and backgrounds, then the ver-
dict is more likely to be trusted. Those outside the jury room may
still disagree with a verdict, and voice that disagreement, but they
will be less likely to make claims of false nullification in an attempt
to discredit the verdict. Rather, they are more likely to say that the
jury reached a verdict that they would not have reached, but they
are willing to believe that the jury reached it in good faith, and
therefore, to accept it.
D. Additional Virtues of Diverse Juries
A diverse jury provides additional benefits to the justice system
as well. 5 1 With diversity, a variety of perspectives are represented
on the jury. 5' When jurors come from different backgrounds and
have different life experiences, they bring to the jury room differ-
ent perspectives through which to view the evidence and to assess
the credibility of witnesses. They bring to the jury room their
"different realities" which they are able to share with their fellow
jurors. To take a fictional illustration, consider 12 Angry Men.152
unfortunately what she is seeing is a system that still shuts the door of opportunity for
Blacks to be involved in this great experiment called a trial byjury.'
Charles Whitaker, Is There a Conspiracy to Keep Blacks Off Juries, EBONY, Sept. 1992, at 54,
available in LEXIS, Market Library, Ebony File (quoting Miami attorney H.P. Smith).
150. Although at this time I am not making an empirical claim about the benefits of di-
verse juries, I will be able to do so when I complete an empirical study entitled "The Ideal of
the Diverse Jury."
151. See, e.g., Hans Zeisel,... And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federal Juiy,
38 U. Cnt. L. REv. 710, 715 (1971); Marder, Gender Dynamics, supra note 91, at 604; see also
Alan Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy, LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1980, at 51, 68 ("Jurors bring a variety of perspectives to their
deliberations that enable [s] them to see beyond the single viewpoint of the judge.").
152. See 12 ANGRY MEN (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer/United Artists 1957).
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Although the jury portrayed in that 1957 movie153 consisted of
white men only, at the very least, it included white men from dif-
ferent economic strata. As a result, one juror, who had grown up
in poverty much like the defendant, was able to explain to the
other jurors, who came from more well-to-do backgrounds, how a
switchblade was properly held and handled.
5 4
A diverse jury is also likely to engage in a more thorough and
searching deliberation.' 5 This is so not only because jurors will
have different perspectives that will be available for group consid-
eration, but also because assumptions and biases are more likely to
be challenged by jurors who do not share them. Jurors who re-
veal group-based stereotypes will find their views challenged by
jurors who belong to those groups and who do not share those
stereotypes.1 57 In contrast, with a homogeneous jury, stereotypical
153. The movie was recently remade, and in the updated version, the jury was far more
diverse than in the original. See 12 ANGRY MEN (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer/United Artists
1997). In the updated version, the jury consisted of seven white men, four African-American
men, and one man of Mediterranean descent. In addition, the foreperson was African
American. The dynamic of a deliberating jury was also explored in a play entitled Voir Dire
by Joe Sutton, in which the six-person jury consisted of four whites, one black and one La-
tino. This jury included both men and women. See Berson, supra note 134, at MI.
154. The jury deliberations portrayed in 12 Angry Men are far from ideal, as the title
suggests. The jury engaged in "verdict-driven" deliberations, in which the jurors voted prior
to discussion, rather than "evidence-driven" deliberations, in which jurors consider all of
the evidence before taking an initial vote. See HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 163-65
(1983). One result was that coalitions formed early in the process and the coalitions were
antagonistic. The jurors bullied each other and engaged in personal taunts. Even the juror
portrayed by Henry Fonda, who came closest to being the ideal juror, by taking the pre-
sumption of innocence and the need to deliberate seriously, nonetheless brought into the
jury room a switchblade he had purchased in a store, thus introducing "extraneous," albeit
exculpatory, evidence to the jury. See FED. R. EvID. 606(b) (providing that jurors may be
questioned by the judge after the verdict on "the question whether extraneous prejudicial
information was improperly brought to the jury's attention").
155. See VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 50 (1986) ("[A] jury
composed of individuals with a wide range of experiences, backgrounds, and knowledge is
more likely to perceive the facts from different perspectives and thus engage in a vigorous
and thorough debate.").
1,56. See id. ("The jury's heterogeneous makeup may also lessen the power of preju-
dice.").
157. Samuel Paz, a criminal defense attorney, described the difference a diverse jury
could make in challenging stereotypes:
Racism is permitted when no one speaks about it. In other words, ... it's OK to
make those inferences if no one will call you on the carpet. If you have one person
who says, 'Wait a minute now. I don't think you're being fair,' and-or 'Maybe you're
being racist' about a particular issue, then most of us will think about that and say...
maybe that's true. Maybe I am. And that's the difference between when you have an
all-white jury and.., even a small mix within the jury.
All Things Considered: Rodney King, supra note 59 (quoting Paz).
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assumptions are more likely to be shared and voiced and less likely
to be challenged.'5"
E. Challenges Posed by Diverse Juries
A diverse jury, while a deterrent to false claims of nullification, is
not without its challenges, one of which will be to reach consen-159
sus. In criminal cases, in federal and in many state courts, the
jury must reach a unanimous decision. The challenge for the di-
verse jury is to reach consensus. With jurors coming from different
backgrounds and holding different views of a case, it may be more
difficult for them to agree on a verdict. Deliberations may be more
trying as jurors with different experiences and backgrounds at-
tempt to convince each other to see the case from their point of
view. One downside of the diverse jury may be a rise in hung juries,
but at this time there is no empirical evidence to support this hy-
pothesis. 16' The upside, however, is that if a diverse jury can reach a
158. If jurors receive reinforcement from each other for racist or sexist comments
made during deliberations, then they are likely to feel free to engage in such comments.
For example, see Powell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 652 So.2d 354 (Fla. 1995), where jurors were
alleged to have made racist remarks and jokes. The court found that such actions would
constitute a violation of"both the federal and state constitutions which ensure[] all litigants
a fair and impartial jury and equal protection of the law." Id. at 358.
159. See infra note 161.
160. Federal criminal juries and many state criminal juries are required to reach a
unanimous verdict. See, e.g., ARIz. CONST. art. II, § 23 ("In all criminal cases the unanimous
consent of the jurors shall be necessary to render a verdict."); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 19 ("In
all other cases [other than civil and criminal misdemeanors] the entire number of jurors
must concur to render a verdict."); FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(a) ("The verdict shall be unani-
mous."); COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-10-108 (1996) ("The verdict of the jury shall be
unanimous."); lAw. REv. STAT. § 83 (1993) ("No person shall be convicted in any criminal
case except by unanimous verdict of the jury."); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1154(o) (West
1996) ("A defendant tried by the court and jury shall only be found guilty... upon the
unanimous verdict of the jury."); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29A.280 (Michie 1992) ("A unani-
mous verdict is required in all criminal trials by jury."); MINN. STAT. § 480.059(7)(i) (1982)
("The supreme court shall not have the power to adopt or promulgate any rule requiring
less than unanimous verdicts in criminal cases."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-603 (1997)
("The verdict must be unanimous in all criminal actions."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1201
(1997) ("In all criminal cases the defendant has the right to be tried by a jury of 12 whose
verdict must be unanimous."); OR. REv. STAT. § 221.349(1) (1997) ("The verdict of thejury
shall be unanimous."); W. VA. CODE § 50-5-8 (1994) ("Any defendant in any criminal action
shall be entitled to a trial by jury, and any such verdict must be unanimous."); Wvo. STAT.
ANN. § 7-11-501 (Michie 1997) ("In all criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous.");
N.M. R. CrM. P. 5-611 (A) (Michie 1999) ("The verdict shall be unanimous ....").
161. One study is currently underway to determine hung jury rates in Los Angeles. See
Is It Time to Replicate The American Jury?, Ass'n of Am. L. Sch. Panel Discussion (Jan. 9,
1998) (author's notes on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Mean-
while, at least one writer, relying on anecdotal evidence, has surmised that minority jurors,
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unanimous decision, then that decision is likely to be widely ac-
cepted and respected.
Although the diverse jury can guard against false claims of nulli-
fication, there is no guarantee that every petit jury will be diverse, 62
and thus false claims will remain a risk, though a reduced one as
efforts are taken to strive for diverse juries. The only way to guar-
antee a diverse jury in every case is to impose quotas on the petit
jury. Although some commentators have advocated a modified
quota system, 163 it is not one that I embrace.164 I think the better
approach is to eliminate, or at least to reduce, all practices that
limit who can serve, such as peremptory challenges, and to expand
all practices that draw jurors from as broad a segment of the com-
munity as possible, such as relying on multiple sources from which
venire lists are created. The goal should be to avoid skewing jury
composition wherever possible and to strive for a process that ap-
proaches random selection of as broad a swath of the community
as possible. In this way, the jury is likely to be diverse, though there
is no guarantee that every jury will be diverse. In the ideal world,
every jury would be diverse; in the real world, however, the politics
required to achieve that goal would tarnish the jury.
CONCLUSION
The Simpson and Koon/Powell verdicts teach many lessons, one
of which is how easy it is to engage in false claims of jury nullifica-
tion, and another of which is how destructive this can be. The
temptation to claim false nullification strikes when there is not
only disagreement with the verdict, but also when there is distrust
of the jury that reached it. One reason there might be distrust is
because that jury falls far short of the ideal of the diverse jury. As a
result, those outside the jury room are suspicious and wonder
whether "different values," such as sympathies or animosities based
particularly African-American women, are refusing to convict under any circumstances and
are leading to a growing number of hung juries. See Jeffrey Rosen, One Angry Woman, NEw
YORKER, Feb. 24 & Mar. 3, 1997, at 54, 55.
162. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 494 (1990) (concluding that there is no con-
stitutional right to a petitjury that mirrors the community).
163. See NancyJ. King, Racialjurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A Contemporary Review of Af-
firmative Action injury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 707, 768 (1993) (suggesting that "courts
analyze which race-conscious reforms are reasonably necessary to maintain public confi-
dence in the impartiality ofjury proceedings by considering.., six circumstances").
164. See Marder, Peremptory Challenges, supra note 91, at 1104-07.
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on race, gender, ethnicity, or some other impermissible character-
istic, played a role in the decisionmaking.
False claims of nullification are harmful in several ways. They
may serve as a way of perpetuating racial stereotypes without
members of the press or public having to admit it. They also serve
as a way of calling into question a decision made by a jury. When
that jury does not look representative of the community, its verdict
is likely to be suspect and false claims of nullification are more
likely to follow. When a false claim is made, it is likely to elicit very
different reactions from those who trust the jury and those who do
not, and that trust may depend on how diverse the jury appears to
be. Finally, false claims are an invitation to other branches of gov-
ernment to step in and "fix" the problem by intruding upon the
jury's deliberations, as the judiciary would do, or by eliminating
the importance of dissenting jurors, as the legislature would do.
One way to reduce false claims of nullification and to increase
public acceptance ofjury verdicts is to allow juries to be as diverse
as possible. This should be done, not through mandating quotas,
which would be divisive, but through eliminating efforts by lawyers
and others to skew jury composition and to create homogeneous
juries. Juries have the potential to be diverse, and to the extent
they fall short of that ideal they arouse suspicion and invite attack,
which has most recently taken the form of false claims ofjury nulli-
fication.
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